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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

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PROLIFERATION ISSUES

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[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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SOUTH AFRICA

Scientists Briefed by Journalists on Red Mercury

MB0511200694 Johannesburg WEEKEND STAR
in English 5-6 Nov 94 p 10

[FBIS Transcribed Text] It was a discussion on nuclear weapons that should have been classified...classified extraordinary, that is. How often do journalists brief scientists on scientific issues?

That's what happened at Eskom's [Electricity Supply Commission] Rivonia headquarters on Wednesday this week. Experts in nuclear technology from across the Transvaal gathered to hear the story behind the mystery substance known as red mercury (RM), which is purported to have a significant nuclear weapons application.

But as they filed into the club auditorium at Megawatt Park it was clear they had brought with them a considerable dose of scepticism: RM, according to Western governments, does not exist; in fact, it is a hoax. As was to be expected, no one at the briefing was about to challenge the official line.

But they were prepared to listen. Scientists had come to hear a presentation based on two years of research by British investigative journalists Peter Hounam and Gwynne Roberts.

Hounam and Roberts, who have already made two television documentaries for Britain's Channel 4, are in SA to make a third, this time in association with WEEKEND STAR.

Police have linked the trade in RM to a number of deaths in the South African chemical and armaments industries. Following a series of WEEKEND STAR disclosures regarding the South African deaths, the Transvaal branch of the Institution of Nuclear Engineers decided that the red mercury issue was at least worth a hearing.

And so it was that at their AGM [annual general meeting] this week Hounam and Roberts walked into the lion's den.

First the documentary, "The Pocket Neutron," aired earlier this year in Britain. A respectful silence.

Then the briefing from Roberts on the political undercurrents caused by RM, its wider ramifications for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the international conspiracy

of silence. So far so good. Then the scientific rap from Hounam, undaunted by the prospect of having to address nuclear scientists on their own terms.

Any questions? Yes, indeed. Why are there so many supposed applications for RM? Why is it kept a secret? How can it possibly generate such high temperatures? Why did the Russian scientists in the documentary talk so openly? Why does it have to be a mercury-based substance? How much is it worth? Is $\text{Hg}_2\text{Sb}_2\text{O}_7$ radioactive? What makes RM so explosive...?

Added one member of the audience: "It's not RM for red mercury but RH for rhino horn—and just about as bogus."

The journalists, unfazed by the assembled talent and nuclear expertise, managed to answer most of the non-technical questions to the scientists' reasonable satisfaction. In fact many of the more scientific aspects were adequately dealt with. All of which gave Hounam the confidence to ask for a show of hands to indicate those who still believed red mercury was nothing but a hoax.

About a quarter of the people in the 60-strong audience raised their hands.

Said Roberts: "A lot of them arrived sceptical and left realising that there was more to red mercury than its being simply a hoax. There was evident concern of the dangers this technology could represent.

"A number of people in the audience refused to identify themselves. We were puzzled by this. I can only assume they worked for some intelligence agency."

Hounam said: "I was impressed by the turnout and by the interest shown. They seemed to accept some of the scientific theories behind how RM supposedly works.

"Now is the time for people to come forward to tell what they know of its use in this part of Africa."

Dave Nicholls, Eskom's nuclear safety manager, technology group, said after the meeting. "Very interesting, but I find some elements of what was said hard to believe, especially those aspects that relate to red mercury and fusion."

John Walmsley, Eskom's chief consultant, radiological safety, and chairman of the institution's Transvaal branch for the past seven years said: "There was a great degree of scepticism, but I thought the presentation made it less easy to be sceptical. It's important that scientists keep an open mind."

Physics Institute Builds New Nuclear Fusion Circulator*OW2510030094 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0733 GMT 21 Oct 94*

[By correspondent Liu Xiaoge (0491 1420 7245)]

[FBIS Translated Text] Chengdu, 21 Oct (XINHUA)—After nearly a year's tense work, the Southwest Nuclear Physics Institute has recently completed the project to rebuild the Huanliu No. 1 circulator (HL-1). The project's completion marks the birth of the Huanliu No. 1 Tokamak (HL-1M), a more advanced laboratory device for controlled nuclear fusion.

The original Huanliu No. 1 circular made tremendous contributions to China's research in controlled nuclear fusion. Its outstanding research results have won China a place in international nuclear fusion research. To meet the needs of development in controlled nuclear fusion research, the Southwest Nuclear Physics Institute carried out comprehensive technological improvements on HL-1's mainframe, electrical, diagnostic, and data processing systems. In addition, the institute also installed supplementary heating apparatus at the megawatt level and an electric current driving device.

Completion of the HL-1M will help China follow closely nuclear fusion research in the world's advanced countries, and carry out leading-edge research in nuclear fusion itself. At present, the HL-1M has entered the stage of integrated shutdown test operation, and a new round of research on Tokamak trapped particle physics and boundary phenomena will soon begin.

Magazine Alleges Nuclear Weapons Aimed at 'Soft Targets'*OW0611104194 Tokyo KYODO in English 1016 GMT 6 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tokyo, Nov. 6 KYODO—China's limited nuclear arsenal is aimed at so-called "soft targets," big cities in enemy countries, a Chinese magazine says in a special issue.

ZHENGMIN, banned from publication since this past summer, reported China's nuclear strategy, quoting He Zhaxiu, Chinese Academy of Sciences professor.

He is former secretary to Qian Xuesen, an honorary chairman of the China Association for Science and Technology who is known as the "father of nuclear missile development."

A copy of ZHENGMIN's special issue on military affairs was made available to KYODO NEWS SERVICE recently.

Western military experts have conjectured China was employing this kind of nuclear strategy, given the level of

China's economic and technological development, but it is the first time it has been acknowledged by an authoritative Chinese scientist.

Since the end of the Cold War, China has continued to ignore world opinion and carry on with tests of its nuclear warheads.

The goal of the testing, some military sources suggest, is to create smaller nuclear warheads while upgrading technology along with plans to strengthen a strategy of creating a nuclear standoff with the smallest possible arsenal.

He, who took part in the formulation of nuclear strategy, told the magazine that after China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, it abandoned its plans to become a nuclear superpower.

He said that China decided that if it attempted to match the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the former Soviet Union, it would "sacrifice the level of life of the people and it would become an obstacle to economic construction."

In order to force a standoff with the limited number of nuclear weapons in its possession, China has decided it would not make a nuclear strike first but would target enemy locations deemed most difficult to defend.

These "soft targets," suggested He, would be hard to defend as concentrated population centers of economy and ordinary military power.

The scientist did not reveal how many nuclear weapons China has in its arsenal, but hinted at the need for technological improvements to decide on the appropriate amount of nuclear firepower.

This would be based on an assessment of the survival rate of Chinese nuclear warheads following a first strike by the enemy, the rate Chinese missiles would hit targets, and the ratio of missiles that could penetrate enemy defenses.

He also said the recent rounds of nuclear disarmament undertaken by the U.S. and Russia have not led to any real reduction in nuclear arms.

He affirmed China's capacity to make a limited retaliation and explained that if the U.S. and Russia would reduce their arsenals, numbering more than 20,000 warheads each, by 1,000 to 2,000 warheads, China would be ready to respond through negotiations.

He explained further China's nuclear nonproliferation policies, saying that Beijing turned down several requests by friendly Southeast Asian nations for cooperation in developing an atomic bomb.

Further, an African nation has offered to buy nuclear weapons for 2 billion dollars, but China has turned down the offer as well, he said.

The magazine has been under a publishing ban for disclosing state affairs, including top secrets of the state such as plans for the construction of an aircraft carrier.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Seminar Reveals Differences on Nuclear Deal

HK0811010294 Hong Kong HSIN PAO in Chinese
3 Nov 94 p 29

[By Chang Yi-fan (1728 0001 1581) in Tokyo on 1 November: "U.S.-DPRK Nuclear Agreement Leads to a Lot of Discussion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I returned to Tokyo from Hong Kong hurriedly on 24 October because I was participating in a two-day academic seminar on "Nuclear Proliferation and Security Guarantees in Northeast Asia" scheduled for 25 October. As a matter of fact, it is not accurate to say that this meeting was an "academic seminar," because except for the U.S. representative, the main representatives from Russia, the Republic of Korea, and Japan were government officials in charge of national security. Their opinions represented, more or less, the views of their respective governments. The U.S. representative was Ms. Kathleen Bailey. This once all-powerful lady, who was in charge of nuclear disarmament negotiations for the State Department under the Reagan and Bush administrations, is now a senior research fellow at an important strategic research institute in the United States. Although the former Republican government official has quite a few complaints about the foreign policy of the current Democratic President Clinton, many of her views still attracted great attention at the meeting.

The focus of meetings on the first day was on how to appraise the agreement reached between the United States and the DPRK on 21 October in Geneva, Switzerland, on the all-round settlement of the DPRK's nuclear plan. Tanaka, chief Japanese representative (also called ambassador) at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, held that this agreement should be affirmed. The greatest achievement was that the DPRK's nuclear developments had been frozen and the deterioration in the trend of development had been terminated. Nasarogin [nasa luojin 4780 5646 5012 6855], chairman of the Russian Security Guarantee Council and former Russian representative to the Geneva disarmament talks, shared this view. He said the agreement was indeed an outcome of compromise between both sides. However, he said, there are three important points: First, the most important projects in the DPRK's nuclear development plan—the graphite deceleration reactor and the nuclear fuel retreatment facilities—have been banned by the agreement. This is a drastic measure against the DPRK's nuclear development, just like taking away the firewood from under the cauldron. Second, the agreement reconfirms the DPRK's position as a member of the "Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty" (NPT). When the Korean peninsula was in crisis, the DPRK declared it would quit the treaty; now, it has given up this idea, and this is good for the NPT. Third, South and North Korea announced a declaration in 1992 on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Shortly after that, the emergence of the North Korean nuclear problem turned the "declaration" into a mere scrap of paper. Now it is time to discuss the "declaration" again. Nasarogin said that according to an analysis based on information obtained

from the "External Information Bureau," a Russian espionage and information organ, Russia did not believe that North Korea had any nuclear warheads. After the agreement between North Korea and the United States, Russia was more optimistic about denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea Escaped Punishment, U.S. Concessions May Be a Danger

Contrary to this optimistic attitude, Ms. Bailey was pessimistic about the situation. She believed that the nuclear threat from North Korea had not been reduced. There is reason to believe that North Korea already possesses nuclear bombs. More than that, it also possesses more than 1,000 tons of chemical materials for chemical weapons and biological weapons using natural vaccinia. Although it is still unknown how North Korea developed long-range guided missiles, its cruise missile technology is already up to standard and has begun to be exported to the Middle East region. The report of a cruise missile launch is not highly accurate, but the launching of such missiles with biological and chemical warheads in the Sea of Japan could threaten all Japanese territorial areas. If such missiles were deployed in the Middle East region, the security of Europe and the United States would be challenged. Ms. Bailey said that under the condition that these existing problems have not been fundamentally resolved, the U.S.-DPRK agreement has allowed North Korea to escape the punishment it deserves and, moreover, obtain unexpected economic aid. In other words, it has "dodged the stick and had the carrot to eat."

Ms. Bailey also pointed out that North Korea is a country which has lost international credibility. Over the past three years since dialogue started between the two countries, it has been perfidious many times. Thus, who can guarantee that it will not repeat the same mistake? She believed that the signing of the U.S.-DPRK agreement indicated the failure of the United States.

Kim Ku-sop, director of the North Korea Policy Office of the ROK's National Defense Research Institute, shared the same view as Ms. Bailey. He said: Before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) carries out effective nuclear examination in North Korea, the concessions made by the United States are dangerous. Perhaps these were based on considerations for the U.S. mid-term elections, which will be held in November, and the issue of the extension of the NPT that the Clinton administration wished to put an end to the talks between the two countries, which had lasted three years, as soon as possible so that it could give an explanation to the voters. Hence, the quick signing of the agreement. "The United States has, in fact, agreed to carry out nuclear inspections in North Korea five years from now. But who knows what will have happened by that time?"

Japan and the ROK Have Misgivings, Russia Disappointed

(Shigeru Akira Takesada) [wu zhen xiu shi 2976 6297 4423 1102], head of the first research office of the Japanese Defense Research Institute, also believes that the agreement between the United States and the DPRK is disturbing and has buried "embers" that could instantly start

a fire. The first "ember" lies in that the agreement has not stated the necessity of inspecting the two installations in the DPRK that the IAEA suspected were nuclear facilities. The second "ember" is that the United States has promised to provide the DPRK with economic aid without fully consulting Japan and South Korea first, which reflects great differences in opinion between Japan, the United States, and South Korea. In other words, (Shigeru Akira Takesada) wanted to express such a misgiving: if Japan and the ROK refuse to pay their share or pay as much as the United States thinks is enough, thus causing the United States to fail to honor its promise, the DPRK is likely to turn against them. Takesada's misgiving is not unjustified. The offer that Clinton has made to help the DPRK remodel its graphite-moderated reactors into light-water reactors will cost \$4 billion. As far as this is concerned, in the first place, the United States cannot afford this, and next, U.S. domestic law provides that no nuclear facilities and no funds for nuclear-related projects should be given to any enemy state. It is impossible for the European countries, such as Germany, France, and Britain, to finance a project to enhance security in Northeast Asia, so the "bill" will finally be forwarded to Japan and the ROK. Four billion dollars is not a small figure, and it has already become a pretty heavy burden for these two countries to find the extra-budgetary financial resources to pay the bill.

Anyway, money is a minor thing, as the cost is not so high as to be unaffordable to Japan and the ROK. What has really made Japan and the ROK unhappy is the way the United States handled the matter. Indeed, the Clinton administration deliberately ignored Japan and the ROK's opinions while seeking an agreement. For this reason, when settling accounts in the future, the United States, Japan, and the ROK will have to drive a hard bargain between themselves.

An interesting episode was that during the seminar (Sanarotsin) [5646 4780 5012 6855] from Russia tried to sell Russian-made light-water reactors. When discussing the influence of the DPRK situation on the NPT structure, (Sanarotsin) suddenly said that Russia would be happy to supply safe and reliable light-water reactors if Japan and the ROK had no difficulty in financing their purchase. When hearing this, the more than 30 participants in the seminar were all surprised and confused. A relevant bureau chief from the Russian Foreign Ministry immediately chipped in to say that the light-water reactors should be purchased through competitive bidding among international suppliers. This shows how eagerly Russia wants to have a hand in the DPRK nuclear reactor remodeling project. However, an authoritative source who was present at the seminar told me that the United States had already decided to let the ROK supply light-water reactors to the DPRK. So Russia is likely to be disappointed in this deal. Tokyo, 1 November 1994

AUSTRALIA

Minister Disappointed With PRC Over Nuclear Test
BK0710080194 Hong Kong AFP in English
0740 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SYDNEY, Oct 7 (AFP)—The Australian government condemned China after it carried

out a presumed nuclear test Friday at the Lop Nor test site in Xinjiang province, and said it would make a formal protest to Beijing.

Acting Foreign Minister Gordon Bilney said it was deeply disappointing China had shown disregard for international opposition to nuclear testing.

The blast, monitored by the Australian Seismological Centre in Canberra at 0325 GMT Friday, had a yield of 40 to 150 kilotonnes of TNT, equivalent to between 3 and 12 times the size of a Hiroshima bomb.

The head of the centre, Ken Muirhead, said the explosion, presumed to have been underground at Lop Nor, was estimated to be equivalent in magnitude to an earthquake measuring 6.1 on the Richter scale.

Muirhead said the centre was reasonably confident it was a nuclear explosion, although there was a possibility—"a very low probability"—that it could have been an earthquake.

Australia protested to China over nuclear tests in October 1993 and in June this year.

"We have been urging China to join other nuclear weapon states in declaring a moratorium on its testing program," Bilney said in a statement.

He said it was vital nuclear weapon states showed restraint during continued negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which Australia hoped could be concluded by early next year.

"China's continued testing is out of step with the positive atmosphere of these negotiations, as well as China's own support for nuclear disarmament and its commitment to negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 1996.

"China must come to terms with the imminent fact of a ban on nuclear testing for all time and in all environments."

He said Australian embassy officials in Beijing would convey Australian concerns about the test to Chinese authorities.

JAPAN

Article Views CIA Report on Reaction to Use of Nuclear Arms

OW0511232094 Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN
in Japanese 4 Nov 94 Evening Edition p 1

[By Toshifumi Kono]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington, 3 Nov—In the second half of the 1950's, during the Cold War age, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States made an analysis of possible reactions to the use of nuclear weapons by the United States in the four types of wars that might have taken place in East Asia, and reached a conclusion negating the use of nuclear arms based on the reasoning that it might arouse a strong "antinuclear sentiment" in Japan. This was disclosed on 3 November by a CIA report prepared then. It is pointed out in the report that "if the United States should resort to nuclear weapons, Japan would probably not approve the use of U.S. military bases

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in the country." Thus, it has come to the front that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has strongly affected the U.S. nuclear policy during the Cold War age.

The report is entitled: "The Use of Nuclear Weapons by the United States in Limited Wars in the Far East, and Reactions of China, the Soviet Union and the Free World." And it was prepared in July 1958 at the request of the National Security Council (NSC) under the (then) Eisenhower administration. This top secret report was declassified last April, and MAINICHI SHIMBUN has obtained a copy of the report from the U.S. National Archives.

According to the document, the report suggests four scenarios: 1) Invasion of the ROK by the DPRK (North Korea); 2) attack on Quemoy and Matsu Islands (in the Taiwan Strait) by China; 3) attack on Taiwan by China; and 4) attack on South Vietnam and Laos by China. And it points out: "In case of the United States launching a nuclear attack on the Chinese Mainland, it is most certain that Moscow and Beijing would counterattack U.S. military bases and units possessing nuclear arms in the Far East, and a nuclear retaliation would become most certain. Moreover, the analysis indicates that retaliation would be limited to the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan Strait, if the use of nuclear arms should be limited to these areas, and that "the Communist bloc would probably retaliate without using nuclear arms" if the use of nuclear arms should be limited to Quemoy and Matsu Islands or to Vietnam and Laos.

Moreover, the report appraises that "many governments of the Free World would be impressed and encouraged by the rapid actions of the United States to prevent invasions by the Communist bloc." On the other hand, however, the report indicates concerns that "the use of nuclear arms by the United States would probably arouse fear of an overall war; extensive denunciation by public opinion, particularly in Asia; and most certainly negative reactions in many countries."

The report also gives a detailed description of the situation in Japan. Among the severe views cited in the report are: "Because of emotional antipathy against nuclear arms, reactions in Japan would be particularly hostile. Perhaps, Japan would not approve the use of U.S. military bases in the country." "As far as the United States is concerned, one of the major issues lies in the reactions in Japan. The fear that Japan might be involved in the war would impose strong pressure on Japan to negate the use of U.S. military bases." "If the state of battle should be prolonged or expanded, the United States will be compelled to withdraw its military bases in Japan. And there would be intensified pressure on the United States to withdraw from Okinawa."

With regard to opposition in Asia, particularly in Japan, the report points out: "The use of nuclear weapons may lead to a feeling that white people are indifferent to the lives of Asian people." And it also warns that even if the use of nuclear arms were able to stop the state of battle without causing serious sacrifices among the general public, "the United States cannot avoid being branded as the first to resort to nuclear weapons."

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Regrets New PRC Nuclear Test

OW0710102994 Tokyo KYODO in English
0950 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tokyo, Oct. 7 KYODO—Japan voiced regret Friday [7 October] over China's nuclear test earlier in the day, the third since October last year, and strongly urged China not to continue testing in the future.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Terusuke Terada told a press conference that Japan had confirmed with the Chinese Foreign Ministry that China conducted a nuclear explosion at 12:25 P.M.

Terada quoted the Chinese Foreign Ministry as saying the details of the test will be reported through the XINHUA NEWS AGENCY.

He also said Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Kunihiko Saito will lodge a protest with Chinese Ambassador to Japan Xu Dunxin later in the evening.

It is "extremely regrettable" and Japan is "seriously concerned" that China has conducted as many as three nuclear tests since October last year while other nuclear weapon states are continuing with the nuclear testing moratorium, Terada said.

"Japan hopes the nuclear test does not affect the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty being conducted at the conference on disarmament in Geneva," he said, and called on the nuclear weapon states to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear tests.

Reports from Australia said an Australian seismological laboratory had recorded data consistent with a nuclear explosion at China's nuclear testing facility in Lop Nor.

The Canberra-based Australian Seismological Center estimated the yield of the explosion at between 40 and 150 kilotons.

Export Control on High-Tech Goods To Increase

OW1210105994 Tokyo KYODO in English
1040 GMT 12 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tokyo, Oct. 12 KYODO—Japan will beef up export control for high technology products by subjecting even general-purpose equipment to such restrictions, trade ministry officials said Wednesday [12 October].

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) will list about 100 items as products which could be converted into mass destruction weapons like nuclear arms, missiles and chemical weapons, the officials said.

Exporters will be required to obtain a MITI permit when they ship these products to countries with risk of conflicts, they said.

The step is in response to a growing concern over proliferation of mass destruction weapons amid unabated outbreaks of regional conflicts following the abolition of an export control under the Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Areas (COCOM), the officials said.

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As a way to address such a concern, the United States and Europe have already introduced systems to restrict exports of general-purpose high tech products.

Items to be put under export restrictions by MITI will include machine tools, semiconductor chips, personal computers, carbon textiles and specialty metals, they said.

Export destinations to be designated as potentially dangerous are 20 countries, including North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Cuba and Libya, they said.

MITI will revise the trade control ordinance by the end of this year for enforcement of the new step early next year, the officials said.

At present, the ordinance prohibits exports of products that would directly lead to production of mass destruction weapons, such as nuclear materials, rocket components, viruses and very sophisticated machine tools.

Agency To Disclose Figures on Total Stockpiles of Plutonium

*OW1610143394 Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese
15 Oct 94 Morning Edition p 1*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Science and Technology Agency [STA] approved a plan to publish every year figures on Japan's total stockpiles of plutonium and its supply-and-demand situation in a white paper on nuclear power. In October last year, the STA made an unprecedented announcement, disclosing the amount of plutonium Japan had in stock. In the future, however, the same ministry will disclose details on the quantity of plutonium at each nuclear facility. The disclosure in the white paper, which is an official report on activities involving nuclear power, is aimed at improving the transparency of Japan's plutonium utilization and also at removing concerns about nuclear proliferation. As a first step, the STA will disclose data on the plutonium supply situation as of the end of 1993 in its 1994 white paper.

In the white papers so far, the STA has disclosed the estimated amount of plutonium and condensed uranium contained in nuclear fuel used currently or in the past by means of a "chart that shows the amount of nuclear fuel materials in Japan." Last year's white paper stated that Japan possessed 33.595 [figure as published] tons of plutonium.

However, regarding the quantity possessed by Japan, the problem lies in the amount of plutonium in storage that could be converted into weapons-grade material. The stored amount concerns plutonium in the naked state [hadaka no jotai] extracted through the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. Japan has hitherto adhered to the principle of not disclosing such data for the sake of ensuring the security of its nuclear materials. In a written answer to a question raised by a dietman last October, it was stated that 1.6 tons were stored at home and 2.9 tons overseas (as of the end of 1992). This is the only case so far in which concerned data have been made public.

However, in addition to concerns about nuclear proliferation, which were accompanied by North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons development and the dismantling of

nuclear weapons in Russia and the United States, the fast breeder nuclear reactor "Monju" of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation began operations. Moreover, it was revealed that some plutonium had been found in a fuel factory. Because of these activities, a growing number of people at home and abroad are calling for regular disclosure of the actual situation regarding Japan's plutonium management.

In its long-term plan for development and utilization of nuclear power, which was prepared in June this year, the STA discussed the prospects for plutonium supply and demand between now and 2010. However, the STA will disclose detailed data in the future. Specifically, the data will include the amount supplied—for example, the amount extracted from domestic reprocessing plants or extracted from reprocessing plants in Britain and France and transported to Japan—on the one hand, and the amount used at fast breeder reactors on the other. By subtracting the amount used from the amount supplied, we can get the amount in storage both at home and overseas.

It seems that the total stockpiles as of the end of 1993, which will be disclosed officially in the white paper on nuclear power in November, were 1.7 tons at home and about four tons abroad.

Tokyo To Give Technical Aid on Nuclear Materials to Belarus

*OW0511003594 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN
in Japanese 1 Nov 94 Evening Edition p 1*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Japanese Government will aggressively provide technical assistance to Belarus, which is now hurrying to revamp its nuclear nonproliferation system. The Science and Technology Agency and the Japan Atomic Power Research Institute [JAPRI] will provide Belarus with an information system to monitor and control the storage and movement of nuclear fuels—including uranium—and technology to manufacture measuring instruments. Using the information system and technology, Belarus will establish a new system of controlling nuclear materials by the end of 1995. Japan has expressed a willingness to provide former Soviet republics with the same information system and technology, and Belarus will be the first former Soviet republic to receive such technical assistance from Japan.

Belarus has no nuclear power plants, but it has an experimental atomic reactor in a research institute called the Susoni [name as published] Center. The atomic reactor is believed to have several kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Belarus joined the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) this February, obliging itself to receive nuclear inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Belarus, which was a nuclear power before becoming an independent nation, still has no knowledge about how to implement a safeguards agreement it has concluded with the IAEA. For this reason, Japan, the United States, Sweden, and the IAEA have recently formulated a concrete assistance plan at the end of their consultations.

Under the assistance plan, Japan will provide Belarus with an information system for monitoring and controlling

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nuclear materials, which uses personal computers developed by the JAPRI. Japan also will provide Belarus with the technology and instruments to measure quantities of nuclear materials, and the instruments will be installed at the Susoni Center. Japan will help Belarus renovate its current telecommunications system into a system that makes it possible for Belarus, Japan, and the IAEA to exchange information on the nuclear materials in Belarus through telephone circuits or satellites.

Protection wards, the control of incoming and outgoing people, and monitoring devices in the Susoni Center are insufficient. In concert with the United States and Sweden, Japan will renovate the center into a structure which makes it hard for nuclear materials to flow outside. The JAPRI, that has already offered Belarus the information system, plans to install it in the center within this year.

Last year, Japan decided to provide \$100 million in technical assistance for dismantling nuclear weapons in Russia and other former Soviet republics. Japan's technical assistance to Belarus is likely to become a model case for international cooperation.

Tokyo To Train Belarus, Kazakhstan Nuclear Officials

OW0411100894 Tokyo KYODO in English
0950 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tokyo, Nov. 4 KYODO—Japan will invite six officials from Belarus and Kazakhstan next week for a training program on establishing a system for controlling nuclear materials, the Foreign Ministry said Friday [4 November].

The ministry and the Science and Technology Agency will sponsor the program, to be held from Monday to Nov. 12, as part of Japan's support to denuclearize the former Soviet republics, it said.

Japan inked accords with Belarus and Kazakhstan in September on providing support to establish systems to control nuclear materials. The two countries are among the four Soviet republics that inherited nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Japan pledged 100 million dollars to help the republics denuclearize.

During their stay in Japan, the officials from Belarus and Kazakhstan will visit Japanese facilities to study ways to control, measure and protect nuclear materials, the ministry said. They will also hold talks with experts from the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, and Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Terusuke Terada said he hopes the training program will help prevent smuggling of nuclear materials from occurring in the two countries. From May to August, German authorities made several seizures of nuclear materials which they suspect originated from Russian warhead factories or nuclear laboratories.

NORTH KOREA

IAEA Reports Evidence of Undeclared Plutonium

SK1810015294 Seoul YONHAP in English
0146 GMT 18 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] United Nations, Oct. 17 (YONHAP)—The UN nuclear watchdog agency has detected evidence that North Korea possesses an undeclared amount of plutonium.

In a report to the United Nations General Assembly on Monday afternoon (New York time), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Hans Blix said little progress has been made in the IAEA's efforts to gain access to additional information and facilities related to suspicions over North Korea's nuclear development program since the agency asked for such access last year.

Noting that North Korea has exacerbated the problem by removing spent fuel rods from its one operating nuclear reactor without appropriate safety measures, Blix declared there is no way of verifying the list of nuclear materials the North declared in 1992, as it has failed to provide transparency under the IAEA nuclear safeguards agreement.

South Korean Ambassador Yu Chong-ha, following Blix's report, said that Pyongyang could clear up the suspicions only if it guaranteed the transparency of its past, present and future nuclear activities.

"When North Korea carries out its duties under the nuclear safeguards pact, South Korea will not spare any effort in supporting North Korea's peaceful applications of nuclear energy," he added.

The German, Japanese, Hungarian and Bulgarian ambassadors, concerned about the North's secretive nuclear program, also urged it to permit IAEA inspections as stipulated by the nuclear safeguards agreement.

But North Korean Ambassador Pak Kil-yon reiterated his government's position against special IAEA checks, saying: "We cannot receive the special inspections because they target military facilities."

He then criticized Japan, claiming that it currently has 1.6 tons of plutonium and will increase the amount to 50 tons—enough to make 6,200 nuclear bombs—by the year 2000.

The General Assembly is expected to adopt a resolution Wednesday regarding the IAEA report on North Korea. The resolution was jointly drafted by 30 nations, including South Korea and the United States.

The resolution will praise the IAEA for its fairness in seeking to have North Korea abide by the nuclear safeguards pact, urge Pyongyang to cooperate with the IAEA in fully implementing the safeguards accord, and support all efforts contributing to the North's implementation of the agreement, including the ongoing North Korea-U.S. talks in Geneva.

Foreign Ministry Announces Freeze in Nuclear Program

SK0111104694 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1038 GMT 1 Nov 94

["DPRK Has Begun Taking Practical Steps for Implementation of DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework, FM Spokesman"—KCNA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pyongyang, November 1 (KCNA)—A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry [FM] of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK] answered a question put by KCNA today concerning the implementation of the agreed framework between the DPRK and the United States.

He said:

To fully implement the DPRK-U.S. agreed framework is a key to the final solution of the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula.

We have already begun taking practical steps to put it into effect.

The DPRK Administration Council decided to stop the construction of the 50,000- and 200,000-kilowatt graphite-moderated reactors from the beginning of November.

Accordingly, necessary steps are now being taken.

The competent organ decided to stop the operation of the 5-megawatt experimental reactor and took a measure to withdraw the new fuel rods which had been prepared for refueling the reactor.

Steps have also been taken to keep the radioactive chemical laboratory and other related facilities frozen.

Last week, we proposed to the U.S. to have immediate negotiations concerning the safety storage of the spent fuel rods and other matters.

These steps indicate that we have already begun fulfilling our obligations under the DPRK-U.S. agreed framework.

SOUTH KOREA

Legislator Insists on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facilities

SK0111063294 *Seoul YONHAP in English*
0604 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Seoul, Nov. 1 (YONHAP)—A ruling party lawmaker, harshly attacking the previous administration's pronounced policy of not going nuclear, called Tuesday on the government to push for efforts to own facilities to reprocess nuclear fuel and enrich uranium.

"We (South Koreans) run about in confusion without a lever in the waves created by the current North Korean nuclear issue," Rep. Yi In-che of the Democratic Liberal

Party (DLP) charged during a National Assembly session convened to interpellate the government's foreign and security policies.

"As one of the reasons for that, I cannot but point out our nuclear policies which have loopholes," said Rep. Yi, who urged the government to strive to acquire nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities.

He also took issue with the "Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" announced by then-president No Tae-u on Nov. 8, 1991. "The very starting point from which the current wrong situation comes lies in the announcement, which allowed our country to totally abandon possession of those nuclear facilities," Yi claimed.

He insisted that a nuclear-free Korean peninsula can be attained through the two Koreas' observance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and limits on atomic arms deployment in the region by the nuclear powers. "Now, we have to drive to possess nuclear fuel reprocessing and enriching systems like Japan on the precondition that the country would faithfully receive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)," opined the assemblyman.

He wondered what kind of international obligations rendered South Korea unable to have such facilities. "Which country around the world, except for South Korea, announced the renouncement of those nuclear facilities?" questioned Yi, emphasizing repeatedly the change in the government's non-nuclear line.

Two Institutes Deny Infiltration by Foreign Hacker

SK0411104094 *Seoul YONHAP in English*
1025 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Taejeon, Nov. 4 (YONHAP)—Two leading South Korean institutes on Friday denied the infiltration by a foreign hacker into their computer system.

"About ten of our data experts carefully examined our computer system, but found no traces of any infiltration by a hacker," a spokesman for the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) said.

A similar denial was made by an official of the Korea Aero-space Research Institute.

The denial came after THE WASHINGTON TIMES reportedly said a young British hacker infiltrated into the computer system of KAERI to siphon off classified information.

The KAERI earlier said the Korean victim of the British hacker might be not KAERI but KARI (Aero-space Research Institute) in view of the fact that the initials of the two institutes resemble each other and that the hacker infiltrated into mostly aerospace-related institutes like the NASA.

SINGAPORE

PRC's Right to Nuclear Test Defended

BK2910145094 Singapore THE STRAITS TIMES
in English 28 Oct 94 p 34

[Editorial: "Testing Time for China"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] China's nuclear tests might have provoked a less strong reaction if there had been better appreciation of the country's present capability and future responsibilities as a major global player. Obviously, the world would be a safer place if all risk of a nuclear Armageddon could be eliminated. That ideal will only be achieved, however, when the Geneva process results in a comprehensive test ban treaty. It is reassuring to note that China has indicated that it will stop its tests as soon as such a treaty has been signed or in 1996, whichever is earlier. Meanwhile, the commitment to promote an early convention "banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices," as set out in the recent joint statement by China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and American Secretary of State Warren Christopher, should help to set misgivings at rest.

What bears stressing is that by virtue of its history, size, population and economic strength, present as well as potential, China is destined to play a major role in the Asia-Pacific region, and, indeed, in world affairs. Its readiness to join the other nuclear powers in working for a test ban treaty and trying to control nuclear proliferation indicates a determination not to shirk the responsibilities of an active participant in multilateral security and economic arrangements. Superpower status has a military dimension too, and it would be unrealistic, as well as futile, to expect China not to develop all the attributes that go with its position. It is in this context that the world must assess the argument that if China's modest deterrent force is to be at all credible in the next century, first generation weapons and delivery systems must be updated in terms of mobility, reliability and overall survivability.

What might be cause for concern is the response in countries that may, for whatever reason, choose to identify China with their own threat perceptions. Since there is no evidence whatsoever to sustain fears that seem more than a little far-fetched, targeting China for blame may turn out to be counter-productive: the Lop Nor tests by themselves have certainly not jeopardised regional stability or endangered the security of any other country. They must be viewed as a part of an overall modernisation programme. Nevertheless, if fears persist, it would be only politic to examine the causes and try, as far as possible, to remove them.

Better understanding with the US Japan and the rest of East Asia would probably answer the question to a large extent. But it may not wish away all problems for the global high table itself does not always appear to be lucid

about its own strategic aims. True, the US, Russia, Britain and France suspended nuclear tests with much fanfare in 1992. They have also cut back their defence spending. But the West's anomalous stand is reflected in the Clinton administration's refusal to commit itself to not being the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, and in its plans to develop a missile defence system. It might be argued, too, that the only purpose that a nuclear freeze would serve at this juncture would be to perpetuate the superiority of the US and Russia which are each believed to have nuclear inventories that are 20 times as large as China's.

The entire question of relative capability has to be seen in the setting of China's position in a new world order. Given this destiny, China cannot afford to be at odds with the rest of the world: its own long-term interest calls for a major political and diplomatic effort to remove suspicion. The Asean Regional Forum may have a role to play in this respect; US Defence Secretary William Perry's suggestion of computer-simulated nuclear tests might provide a technological alternative. But there is no substitute for mutual trust, which can only be engendered by transparent policies that make resurgent China more acceptable to the rest of the world.

THAILAND

Thailand Displays Interest in Russian Weapons

LD1710121994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1157 GMT 17 Oct 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow October 17 TASS— Talks on possible purchases of Russian weapons by Thailand will be held by Lieutenant-General Viktor Samoylov, managing director of the state-owned Rosvooruzheniye Company, with the leadership of the Thai Defence Ministry.

He flew from Moscow to Bangkok on Monday at the invitation of Thai Defence Minister Wichit Sukmak.

ITAR-TASS learnt at the press service of the Rosvooruzheniye Company that Thailand, as well as other South-East Asian countries, modernises its armed forces and examines a chance of arming them with advanced weapons distinguished for high combat performance and reliability.

The press service noted that the Rosvooruzheniye Company, "a state guarantor of military cooperation between Russia and foreign countries, including Thailand," is ready to supply such weapons to Thai Land Forces, the Air Force and the Navy.

According to information available to ITAR-TASS, the Thai Government examines a possibility of purchasing the latest bombers and fighters, including MiG jets, as well as air defence systems, displaying interest in Scud missiles.

BULGARIA

Border Officers Seize 'Plutonium' Capsules From Turkish Bus

AU1910120494 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian
14 Oct 94 p 1

[Report by Asen Nedyalkov: "Capsules Containing Plutonium Seized in Malko Turnovo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Burgas—The regional police directorate has reported that four lead capsules suspected of containing radioactive materials were seized yesterday at the Malko Turnovo Border Checkpoint. The consignment was concealed in the baggage compartment of a Turkish Mercedes bus with the registration number 34AHC555 that was travelling from Romania to Turkey. The sealed containers are 28 cm long and 10 cm in diameter, each weighing about 7 kg.

Readings were immediately taken on the spot with a radiation meter type RR 51-M, which indicated high levels of radioactivity. All the 37 Romanian passengers were detained for questioning, then released in the afternoon and taken to Istanbul on another Turkish bus. None of them admitted to being the owner of the "illegal baggage." The two bus drivers are being held under arrest at the regional police headquarters. They told the investigation authorities that they did not know anything about the radioactive materials found in the bus. A police source stated that it is still not clear what the lead vessels contain. This can only be established after the contents are subjected to spectral analysis at the Nuclear Physics Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences or the National Institute of Forensic Science and Criminology. According to experts, the containers are likely to contain plutonium.

The consignment was seized as the result of an advance tipoff. According to a police theory, it is likely that the shipment was intended as a decoy, to distract attention prior to smuggling large quantities of radioactive materials or narcotics. The real shipment may not necessarily be sent through Malko Turnovo, since it is safer to consign the goods through Burgas Airport or Seaport.

CZECH REPUBLIC

Techniques To Stop Nuclear Smuggling Discussed

LD1910221794 Prague CT 1 Television Network in Czech
1830 GMT 19 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest form of criminality, which came into existence some two years ago, is the illegal trading in radioactive materials. The interest comes mostly from the high-risk areas where imports of these materials and the processing technologies are prohibited. Other interested parties recruit from various extremist organizations who intend to use these substances for radioactive blackmail and terrorism.

[Begin unidentified Czech police official recording] The most frequent deals concern Osmium, isotope 187. The price for one gram of this substance ranges between \$60,000 and \$70,000. So, if you realize that physically we are unable to detect one gram, which can be hidden

anywhere and whose radiation value is virtually zero, you can imagine how safe it is to transport it. [end recording]

Some 108 illegal deals were recorded all over the world last year. The motives are clear. While one kilogram of plutonium costs legally between \$100 and \$500, the same amount will cost several million U.S. dollars on the black market. The same applies to some fifteen other substances that are interesting for the nuclear mafia. Policemen, politicians, and the media were, until recently, unable to combat this kind of criminality.

[Begin Czech police official recording] We have proposed recently an amendment to Article 186 of the Criminal Code, the idea of which is similar to that embodied in the article on the production of toxic substances and poisons. Parliament has accepted the proposal and passed the amendment. So now I can tell you that if the third section of that article is breached there is a penalty of up to fifteen years in prison. [end recording]

The amount of illegal trading in nuclear substances has been rising despite the fact that only five percent of the deals work out. That's the reason why the police force is preparing measures that will disclose the transportation of these substances at border crossings.

[Begin Czech police official recording] We will gradually equip border crossings with devices so the individual dosimetric control can be carried out even on trucks. We, that is the police force, are already so equipped. [end recording]

Some detectors, designed to prevent the smuggling of radioactive materials to Germany, have already been installed at some border crossings with the Czech Republic. The information has been confirmed by the press officer of the Bavarian Ministry of Interior, as well as by the press officer of the Bavarian frontier police. This measure is not directed against the Czech Republic at all. It is part of a project worked out to combat the so called nuclear mafia. Both press officers have stressed that full details concerning exact locations of Geiger-Mueller computers at road or railway crossings cannot be revealed in order not to inform smugglers. According to my information these are the first steps taken under the project into which Bavaria intends to invest almost one million German marks.

All police stations in Bavaria should be equipped with the detectors by 1996. Some policemen and some mobile police units will receive personal dosimeters. The same equipment is being considered for road patrols carrying out routine checks, for example on motorways. The Bavarian police have adopted these measures after four major cases when smuggled plutonium-239 was discovered and seized. The largest shipment has been seized at the Munich airport in August where 300 grams of this radioactive substance used in manufacturing atomic bombs was seized.

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ROMANIA

Police Say Smuggled Uranium Originated in Former USSR

AU1710091894 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
12 Oct 94 p 1

[Report by Patru Musat: "Seven Kilograms of Uranium Seized in Urechesti"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Officers of the Weapons, Explosives, and Drugs Department of the General Police Inspectorate have identified and arrested Victor Barta, 45, Ion Bulgariu, 35, and Ion Baleca, 29, all from the Republic of Moldova; Abdul Hafez Moh'D Salem, 36, and Fuad Abdel Hatem, 39, both Israeli citizens; and Florin Lenghel, 18, and Dumitru Iordan, 39, who are Romanian citizens. They were arrested in the "Bachus" bar in the Urechesti Commune, in Vrancea County, trying to sell for \$400,000 seven kilograms of uranium and some strontium, a very dangerous radioactive substance, in a lead pipe. The investigation carried out so far indicates that these radioactive substances originated in various states of the former USSR and were brought into Romania illegally.

Police Arrest Radioactive Fuel Smugglers

AU3110160294 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 28 Oct 94 p 16

[Report by M. Ionita: "Uranium Is Being Sold at an Inn in Valea Ursului"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At an inn in Valea Ursului, near Pitesti [Arges County], three uranium thieves—Ion Popescu, Mugur Scarlat, and Ion Gealapu—have been arrested during a covert police operation at the very moment that they were handing over a stainless steel tube filled with 230 pellets of radioactive material weighing more than three kilograms to G. Simonca and C. Gabor, who had come here from the city of Cluj especially for the purpose. If they

can even rob special factories producing radioactive fuel, what should we expect of other facilities?

SLOVAKIA

Customs Director Says Uranium Smuggling Cannot Be Prevented

AU2510172194 Bratislava DENNIK in Slovak
21 Oct 94 pp 14,15

[Interview with Dr. Jaromir Kaliciak, director of the Central Customs Administration, by Vladimir Donner; place and date not given: "Not Even Our Customs Officers Can Discover Uranium Smuggled for an Atomic Bomb"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted]

Donner: Let us turn to radioactive uranium. Are our border crossing points safe from its conveyance?

Kaliciak: We have been equipped with detectors since the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant; however, they are no longer suitable.

Donner: So, it is possible to bring a kilogram of uranium in a lead container across our border?

Kaliciak: At the moment, without the necessary equipment, we cannot prevent this. The Germans have been involved in most of the cases concerning the discovery of uranium. They have adapted their ports and airports for this, but even they do not have the necessary equipment at road border crossing points. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on supervising the centers where such materials can be obtained for smuggling.

Donner: Do you agree with the view that it is possible to smuggle across our borders enough radioactive uranium to make an atomic bomb?

Kaliciak: In essence, yes. No customs officer can detect it without the necessary equipment—not only our customs officers, but customs officers throughout Europe.

ARGENTINA**Foreign Minister Cited on Nonproliferation Treaty**

PY0511021194 Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL
in Portuguese 2 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Maria Helena Tachinardi, in Buenos Aires]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Argentine Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella on 1 November reiterated his country's willingness to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) before April 1995, when the Treaty will be revised. Despite being undermined by the failure of NPT

signatory countries like Korea and Iraq to meet their commitment to eliminate nuclear proliferation, the Argentine Government deems it important to endorse it, along with other countries, in order to "strengthen security measures."

During his tour of eastern Europe, Brazilian President-elect Fernando Henrique Cardoso said he would study the possibility of signing the NPT, which Itamaraty has thus far considered discriminatory. This signal was very positively received by Argentine diplomats last week. [passage omitted]

EGYPT

Musa Criticizes Israel's Nuclear Policy

NC0411222294 Cairo MENA in Arabic
2200 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Cairo, 4 Nov (MENA)—Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa has criticized Israel's nuclear policy. He said that this policy is causing regional concern and must be confronted. He warned that for stability to be established in the Middle East, all countries in the region must be free of mass-destruction weapons.

'Amr Musa delivered a speech this evening at a seminar held by the Center for Strategic and Political Studies of AL-AHRAM newspaper on the silver jubilee of the establishment of the Center. The paper will publish this seminar in its issue for tomorrow, Saturday.

The minister expressed regrets over the current contradictions in the Arab world where, while the gap in the Arab-Israeli conflict is decreasing, the gap in inter-Arab conflicts is increasing.

He said that Egypt is opposed to all those who claim that the role of the Arab League is over. He affirmed that it will continue to be a home for all the Arabs.

INDIA

Four Arrested in Shillong on Charge of Uranium Smuggling

BK1610085694 Delhi All India Radio Network in English
0435 GMT 16 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Meghalaya police have arrested four people in Shillong on charges of smuggling uranium. According to the state police chief, the arrest took place after a tip was received that 2.5 kg of uranium had been taken to Shillong for shipment to another country. Further details are awaited.

Meanwhile, security has been increased around the uranium mining site in the West Khasi Hills District.

Operation Launched To Trace 'Huge' Uranium Quantity

BK1810044494 Delhi All India Radio Network in English
1530 GMT 17 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Meghalaya police have launched a massive search operation to trace the huge quantity of uranium suspected to have been hidden in the West Khasi Hills district.

The director general of police, Mr. D.N. Srivasatava, said in Shillong that four persons have already been arrested in this connection. They have confessed to have kept 2.5 kg of uranium hidden for some time.

PAKISTAN

U.S. Offer of 'Non-Intrusive' Nuclear Monitoring Mocked

BK2610100594 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
26 Oct 94 p 1

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Islamabad, Oct 25—A piece of rock was picked up from somewhere around Kahuta. It

was no ordinary stone. The rock-like object was "live" and was emitting radio signals of an unfamiliar frequency. The "find" was the culmination of a quiet but brisk combing of the area carried out by experts in electronic surveillance.

The "rock" turned out to be a camouflaged, highly sophisticated device to monitor a variety of activity related to the presence and handling of radio-active materials.

The clandestine attempt to monitor work at the Kahuta Research Laboratories was uncovered almost immediately after the device was placed in the general proximity of Kahuta where Pakistan's nuclear research facilities were located. Undetected, the device could have served as what is now called a "non-intrusive" monitoring instrument.

The incident occurred in the mid-eighties. No conclusive evidence was available as to who put the device in the secure area. Although an outstanding demonstration of the efficiency and competence of the security arrangements at Kahuta, the incident remained largely un-publicised. No formal protests were made and no one particularly accused. However, quite a few parties were and continue to be immensely interested in gathering as much information about Pakistan's nuclear research programme as possible. Certainly, one of these, or a combination of these interested quarters were responsible for that unsuccessful attempt at nuclear espionage. "Yes that was a memorable evening, particularly because U.S. Ambassador Dean Hinton was there and an interesting thing happened towards the end when coffee was being served," recalls a guest at one of General Zia's little parties which he was fond of hosting at his residence. He would invite only a very small number of people. "Ambassador Hinton was unusually upbeat. A beaming Mr Hinton was telling the president about how accurate and dependable their monitoring of Pakistan's nuclear research was. The president was very attentive and looked amazed. Then, there was that hearty laugh which inspired an English journalist to call him "a laughing cobra." After a pause, the general turned towards Dean Hinton and said: "If you are referring to that stone, Mr Ambassador, it is of no use to you now. We picked it up the next morning it was put there." Mr Hinton went pale in the face. Till then, I had not seen a man deflate instantly," concluded the guest who prefers to remain anonymous.

When Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott suggested verifiable capping of Pakistan's nuclear programme in April last and talked of a non-intrusive monitoring of Pakistani nuclear facilities, he meant putting something similar to that "rock" inside our nuclear facilities, of course with increased power, range, sophistication and efficiency. The other difference was that the U.S. wanted to do that with the agreement, knowledge and permission of the Government of Pakistan!

The Americans would want us to believe that this kind of monitoring will be non-intrusive and help the U.S. administration in convincing the U.S. Congress that Pakistan's capping of its nuclear programme is now verifiable. On its part, the argument goes, the Congress can feel more comfortable in reviewing restrictions, primarily the ones under Pressler Law, on U.S. assistance to Pakistan.

Whatever else may be said of this "novel" idea of the U.S. policymakers, they certainly seem to be an innocent lot of people and tend to see others in their own image. They not only led themselves to believe that such a monitoring would really be "non-intrusive," but also took it for granted that Pakistanis too would think so and agree. Well, they are welcome to believe whatever suits them. So far as

Pakistanis are concerned, they would feel extremely exposed in the presence of such a device.

"Intrusive or not, who likes monitoring devices in one's own bedroom?" This is how technical experts here react to the U.S. proposal for allowing non-intrusive monitoring of Pakistan's nuclear installations.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Russian-Kazakh Military Cooperation Treaty

LD2410215494 Almaty SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA
in Russian 19 Oct 94 p 2 (tentative)

[FBIS Translated Text]

Treaty Between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on Military Cooperation

The Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, hereafter referred to as the two parties,

being guided by the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation signed on 25 May 1992,

taking into account previously signed accords on cooperation in the field of defense within the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and on a bilateral basis in the interests of ensuring collective security,

proceeding from the necessity of a strict and consistent fulfillment by the two sides of their obligations arising from the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 31 July 1991 and the protocol to it signed on 23 May 1992 in Lisbon, hereafter referred to as START I and the Lisbon Protocol respectively,

acknowledging the necessity of combining their efforts and coordinating their activities to ensure a reliable joint defense within the framework of a common military-strategic area,

expressing the aspiration to attach a new quality to and guarantee a legal basis for military cooperation between the two parties,

have agreed to the following:

Article 1.

For the purposes of this treaty the following terms mean:

"Strategic nuclear forces"—military formations that include formations, units, establishments, organizations, and installations which possess as part of their weaponry or store strategic nuclear weapons and parts to ensure their functioning.

"Unified military formations"—units and formations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Armed Forces of the Russian Federation which are deployed by the two parties to solve joint defense issues.

"Defense installations"—test grounds, military installations, sites of industrial representatives and battlefields located on land on the territories of the parties which may be used by the parties jointly or transferred by one party, including on lease terms, to another party, to be used for military purposes with the aim of consolidating the defense capability of both parties.

"Carrier"—an intercontinental ballistic missile (IBM), a heavy bomber, an air-launched cruise missile.

"Nuclear ammunition"—the live part of an IBM or air-launched cruise missile that contains a nuclear charge.

Article 2.

The two parties confirm their obligations on a friendly basis for inter-state relations on principles of mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force or threat of its use, equality of rights and non-interference in the internal affairs, good-neighborly implementation of treaty obligations in accordance with the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation signed on 25 May 1992, and also observance of other universally recognized norms of international law.

In the event of a situation arising which threatens the security, independence, or territorial integrity of one of the parties, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation will immediately hold consultations and undertake specific measures to give each other necessary assistance, including military assistance, in accordance with international law, the bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed on 25 May 1992 and the Treaty on Collective Security signed on 15 May 1992.

Article 3.

Strategic nuclear forces based on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation implement tasks in the interests of the security of the two parties.

The Republic of Kazakhstan, taking into account the established system of functioning of strategic nuclear forces on its territory, gives the aforementioned military formations of strategic nuclear forces the status of strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation—Russian military formations based on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan on a temporary basis.

Until the complete destruction of the strategic nuclear weapons temporarily stationed on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan or their withdrawal to the territory of the Russian Federation, the decision about the necessity to use them is made by the president of the Russian Federation upon agreement with the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

At the same time the Russian Federation guarantees the adoption of organizational and technical measures which exclude the unauthorized use of the strategic nuclear weapons located on territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The conditions for deploying strategic nuclear forces on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which shall correspond to the norms of international law, are to be determined by a separate agreement.

Article 4.

All movable military property and military real estate is the property of the party on whose territory it was based on 31 August 1991.

The Russian Federation acknowledges the right of the Republic of Kazakhstan to receive the equivalent (money

or in other forms) of the value agreed by the parties for nuclear ammunition materials, carriers and other equipment and property of the strategic nuclear forces which was stationed on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 31 August 1991 upon their withdrawal to the territory of the Russian Federation.

At the same time an estimate of the cost of materials and equipment, and of the Russian Federation's expenses in maintaining, transporting and utilizing them, as well as an estimate of the share of the equivalent value in favour of the Republic of Kazakhstan is made by the parties in accordance with agreed procedure.

The property right to installations, buildings and constructions created since 31 August 1991 or to weapons, military hardware, equipment and property imported after that date belongs to the party which finances the relevant works. If the financing is shared, the property right is to be determined by separate agreements taking into account their individual input.

The parties confirm the possibility of the armed forces of one party using installations and constructions situated on the territory of the other party. The list of military installations and constructions and also the procedure and conditions for their operation are established by separate agreements.

Proceeding from the interests of improving joint defenses and strengthening national security, each party, in accordance with its legislation, may transfer the property of its own armed forces into the possession or use of the other party on mutually beneficial conditions, including lease conditions.

Each of the sides is not bound to make any compensation to the other party, if there is no other accord in accordance with separate agreements, for development by the latter of military installations or land located on the territory of the former and used for military purposes, or for buildings or constructions situated on it upon the expiry of this treaty or for the early return of installations and land plots.

Article 5.

The status of defense installations which are used jointly by the two parties is determined on the basis of the powers of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation as states managing these installations and their use and supplying materials and equipment to them, and also the joint powers of the two parties in controlling the activities and use of the aforementioned installations in the interests of raising the defense potential of the two parties.

Parties carrying out the functions of management and use of and the supply of materials and equipment to strategic nuclear forces and defense installations leased from each other are fully responsible for their safe use and for maintaining the necessary level of nuclear and other security.

At the same time, each of the parties undertakes to refrain from activities that in any way could hinder the other party in carrying out its treaty obligations, including those

arising from START I, the Lisbon protocol, and also the functioning of its state bodies and/or cause damage to state and/or private property.

The Russian Federation adopts measures agreed with the Republic of Kazakhstan on clearing up the after-effects of the activities of strategic nuclear forces situated on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan and also of defense installations transferred to the Russian Federation by the Republic of Kazakhstan. If extraordinary situations arise, the two parties adopt urgent measures to deal with them and immediately inform each other about it.

Article 6.

Recognizing the importance of strictly following the provisions of the USSR-U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 26 May 1972 and also the mutual interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, the two parties proceed from the understanding that use of the Sary-Shagan test ground will be undertaken with the aim of creating and improving the anti-ballistic missile defense system, or components of it, situated in the region, as defined in Article 3 of the aforementioned treaty. At the same time, the conditions for using the Sary-Shagan test ground by the parties are determined by a separate agreement.

Article 7.

The parties will render mutual help to each other in implementing multilateral international treaties and political obligations to cut and limit strategic offensive and conventional weapons.

When concluding treaties and agreements in the sphere of military cooperation and equipment and weaponry deliveries with third countries, each of the parties undertakes to take into account the interests of the other party.

Article 8.

The Ministries of Defense of the two parties work out and conclude separate agreements on questions of joint planning and using troops in the interests of the mutual security of the two parties, and plan and conduct joint measures to train command bodies and troops on the territory of either party upon mutual agreement.

The two parties can create unified military formations under a unified command.

Article 9.

The procedure for managing and staffing defense installations used jointly by the parties, unified military formations and unified commands, and also of supplying them with materials and equipment, is determined by a separate agreement.

Article 10.

The two parties cooperate in the field of military intelligence.

Each of the two parties undertakes not to conduct military intelligence activities directed against the other party.

Article 11.

The sides shall conclude a treaty on using the forces and facilities of the naval forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the navy of the Russian Federation on the Caspian Sea in the interests of jointly ensuring the security of the two parties.

Article 12.

Issues of the legal status of servicemen in the armed forces of one party serving on the territory of the other party, the members of their families, their pension provision, and other issues of the social and legal protection of the aforementioned persons shall be determined by a separate agreement.

The two parties offer their citizens serving outside the borders of their state guarantees in providing and implementing social and civil rights envisaged by their legislation.

The two parties recognize the validity of ranks conferred on servicemen, state awards, certificates of education, and also guarantee pension provision, offering privileges to servicemen, persons who have left military service, and members of their families in accordance with the current legislation of the parties, taking into account their years of service in the forces of the former Soviet Union and subsequent service in the armed forces of the parties, including contract service.

The parties guarantee equal rights to civilian personnel, irrespective of their citizenship, when offering them employment in military units, enterprises, and institutions of their own armed forces and undertake to take into account this period of their work in their work record when granting a pension.

If one party disbands military units, institutions and establishments located on the territory of the other party, the former will undertake to pay compensation to civilian personnel in accordance with its labor legislation.

The parties shall consult each other on improving and bringing closer together their national legislation, including legislation on financial and social security for servicemen and civilian personnel in the armed forces and also on granting privileges to servicemen and persons who have left military service and members of their families.

Article 13.

Persons who are part of military units, institutions, and establishments shall cross the state border of the two sides on a non-visa basis, without receiving passports for foreign travel or any stamps of permission in passports, upon presentation of an identity card (military cards, internal passports) and work travel documentation (holiday permits, instructions), as shall their underage children upon being entered in the relevant documents. When appointed to a new place of service or permanent place of residence, they shall convey private property across the state border between the two parties without customs, taxes and other duties being collected.

Admission across the state border of one party of subdivisions, units, and detachments of over more than fifty

persons from the armed forces of the other party shall be effected in conformity with timely notification and agreement between the defence ministries of the two parties.

Article 14.

Material and technical provision of the military formations shall be carried out by the defense ministries of the two parties on mutually beneficial conditions, guaranteeing high level support for the combat readiness and combat capability of their armed forces and unified military formations and shall be regulated by individual agreements.

Article 15.

The activities of military formations of one party stationed on the territory of the other party shall be financed by the party under whose jurisdiction they are.

Issues of the circulation of the currencies of the parties with the aim of providing for the vital activities of servicemen and military formations of the parties stationed on their territories shall be regulated in conformity with the agreement between the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

Article 16.

Each party in its activities on the sites and land of the other party undertakes not to violate either the state and public security of the other party or the individual security of the citizens of the latter.

Article 17.

The two parties pursue a coordinated policy in the areas of joint design, production, repair and supply of arms, military equipment and material and technical resources in the interests of comprehensive provision for the armed forces, defense installations and unified military formations, and coordinate issues of military and technical cooperation, at the same time ensuring the preservation and development of established cooperation links between enterprises designing and manufacturing arms and military equipment. Supplies and services shall be effected on a duty-free basis at prices set by each party for its own needs. Prices and tariffs are agreed by the parties and determined in every case by a separate agreement. Issues of coordinating policy in the sphere of armaments and military equipment, as well as mutual supply of production (work and services) shall be determined by special agreements on the basis of the joint arms programs.

The parties shall cooperate in the spheres of the defense industry, research, and experimental and design work, retaining and developing established specialization and cooperation.

In order to implement a coordinated policy in the military and technical sphere the parties shall establish an interstate commission for military and technical cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation.

Article 18.

The parties retain the existing procedure for training and preparing officers and junior military specialists for the armed forces of both parties in line with relevant agreements.

Article 19.

The parties retain the existing system for of all kinds of communications, for anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missile defense, for notification and communications and take agreed measures on their development.

The parties cooperate in the field of military transportation. The procedure for such cooperation shall be defined by a separate agreement.

The parties retain a single air space for the flights of military and civil aircraft and the joint air-traffic control system for these flights on the basis of the relevant agreements.

Article 20.

With the aim of strengthening discipline and law and order in the armed forces, at defense installations used by the parties jointly or on lease terms and at unified military formations the parties coordinate their actions in the law enforcement field.

Article 21.

The parties plan joint measures and render mutual assistance in resolving ecological problems connected with the consequences of military activities.

Article 22.

The present agreement is not aimed against any other states and does not affect the rights and obligations of the parties resulting from other international agreements of which they are participants.

Article 23.

The parties will not allow their territory to be used by third states with the aim of carrying out activities aimed against the other party.

Article 24.

With the aim of implementing the provisions of this treaty, and also in the interests of broadening and further deepening cooperation in the field of defense, the parties are creating a joint committee which will function according to the regulations approved by the parties.

Article 25.

Amendments and addenda to this treaty can be introduced by the mutual agreement of the Parties.

The treaty will be ratified and come into force from the date of exchanging the ratification credentials.

The treaty will run for ten years. Its effect will then be automatically prolonged for a further ten years if neither of the parties, less than six months before the expiry date of the treaty, notifies the other party in writing about its wish to end the treaty.

The present treaty is temporarily put into effect from the day it is signed.

Signed in Moscow on 28 March 1994 in two copies, each in Kazakh and Russian, moreover both texts have the same force.

On behalf of the Republic of Kazakhstan [signature illegible]

On behalf of the Russian Federation [signature illegible]

Protocol on the Agreed Understanding of Article 4 of the Treaty Between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on Military Cooperation of 28 March 1994

The Republic of Kazakhstan and Russian Federation proceed from the understanding that in the first paragraph of Article 4 of the Treaty Between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on Military Cooperation of 28 March 1994, the property right mentioned of the Republic of Kazakhstan to movable military property situated on its territory on 31 August 1991, in the section concerning nuclear ammunition, applies to the material for such ammunition and not for assembled ammunition.

On behalf of the Republic of Kazakhstan [signature illegible]

On behalf of the Russian Federation [signature illegible]

Moscow, 28 March 1994

RUSSIA

U.S. 'Double Standard' on Pakistani Missiles Criticized

95WP0013A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Oct 94 p 6

[Article by Aleksey Solodov: "Missile From the East"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pakistan is awaiting from day to day the arrival of Chinese military specialists to train the Pakistani subunits that are to service the M-11 missile batteries supplied by China. And before the end of the present year another group of Chinese military specialists will undertake the installation of the missiles and launchers.

The M-11 launcher—a modernized version of the well-known Soviet Scud—has a range of approximately 300 km and can carry a nuclear payload. It is known that these launchers are being sent to Pakistan in accordance with a secret Pakistan-China deal concluded back in 1988, although both countries deny this.

Indirect confirmation of the existence of the deal was the fact that Islamabad made a payment of the order of \$15 million this August within the framework of its commitments ensuing from this agreement with Beijing (we would note in parenthesis that, according to certain information, the funds for the purchase of the weapons are coming to Pakistan also from an established system of drugs trafficking that makes its transactions where Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan intersect).

Other confirmation of the deal is the recent statement of a U.S. State Department spokesman, who said: "...we have no actual, exhaustive evidence that even one M-11 battery has already been deployed on Pakistani territory but we have firmly established the fact of supplies there from China of the components of this system." We would add that this was established by American spy satellites back in 1992. This was why last August Washington announced the imposition for a two-year period of limited trade and economic sanctions against Pakistan and China.

Thus the supplies will, by all accounts, continue in the future also. In addition, Zamir Akram, consul at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, recently publicly acknowledged that "Pakistan has never made any secret of the fact that it is receiving missiles from China" and had even "notified the U.S. Administration of this."

As practice shows, despite Washington's statements to the effect that the Pakistani-Chinese contract is a violation of the international regime of control of the proliferation of missiles and missile technology and falls under the "restriction regime" and that the missiles could increase instability in South Asia and cause a deterioration in Pakistan's relations with India, the United States is in practice supporting its old ally on the South Asian subcontinent.

This is called a "double standards" policy, as the threats on the part of the United States that it would apply sanctions against Russia and India unless Russia refused to supply India with the technology for cryogenic rocket engines are still fresh in everyone's memory.

Thoughts of "double standards" are induced also by the fact of the recent American-Pakistani joint naval maneuvers in the Arabian Sea in the area of the major Pakistani port of Karachi. They were conducted in an atmosphere of top secrecy, but it was learned that their purpose was to perfect interaction in training operations in the use of ship-to-ship-class Harpoon missiles and the detection of "enemy" submarines. There arises the legitimate question: Who is this "enemy" of Pakistan and the United States in South Asia?

In this connection the newspaper INDIAN EXPRESS observed that the maneuvers are all the more astonishing in that they began after Nawaz Sharif, former prime minister of Pakistan, had caused a furor in Washington, declaring that Islamabad had an atomic bomb.

Proceeding from the adduced chain of facts, it may be concluded that there are perfectly definite forces that have an interest in the preservation of an atmosphere of instability on the South Asian subcontinent particularly now, when tension in the Kashmir region is unabating and when clashes on the Tajik-Afghan border continue.

Physicist Proposes IAEA-Monitored 'Nuclear Fingerprinting'

MM0610144394 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Oct 94 p 2

[Report by Sergey Leskov: "Russian and American Scientists Develop Means To Combat Nuclear Smuggling"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpts] Scandals linked with the smuggling of nuclear material have been flaring up of late in various countries. And, although the suppliers have never yet been established, Western public opinion is inclined to believe that the contraband is coming from Russia, other former USSR countries, or former socialist countries. [passage omitted]

At the recent international conference named for Eduardo Amaldi (for many years president of the Italian Academy of Sciences) Vitaliy Goldanskiy, a Russian academician and general director of the Joint Chemical Physics Institute, voiced a proposal which he figuratively termed "nuclear fingerprinting." It boils down to the following—highly enriched uranium and plutonium are specific in terms of their isotope and chemical composition and their spectral radiation. It is impossible to confuse one enterprise's product with another enterprise's—it is just as unique as a fingerprint. If all producers of weapons-grade nuclear material submitted examples of their output to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], you would only need to check on a card index to identify the smuggler. It would be, as Academician Goldanskiy put it, a kind of "nuclear Interpol."

Of course, there is a danger that nuclear weapons producers may not be happy about this idea. To a certain extent the "fingerprinting" would reveal secrets of their technological processes. But the risk of revealing some secrets cannot be compared to the ever-expanding smuggling of radioactive materials.

During the same period the IAEA received a report from Prof. Ken Moody, who heads the Nuclear Chemistry Department at the Livermore Laboratory (the biggest nuclear-weapons production center in the United States). His proposals for the marking of enriched materials are similar to Academician Goldanskiy's ideas. There is to be a special IAEA session in early November to study the possibility of "nuclear fingerprinting," and all nuclear-weapons producers will be invited to send their own experts to sit on a commission to be set up.

Shikhany CBW Facility's Future Still Undecided

MM2810124994 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 05000 GMT 28 Oct 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report from Saratov Oblast by I. Deryugin and Ye. Gerasimenko, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[FBIS Translated Text] [050440] [Deryugin over video of country road with settlement in middle distance] Shikhany is a small settlement in Saratov Oblast which has been closely associated with chemical weapons throughout its existence. On a territory of 400 square km, fenced off by barbed wire, there is a military institute which used to develop various kinds of chemical weapons and a test range where these weapons were tested. It would appear that there are now fewer secrets surrounding Shikhany. As for the chemical weapon destruction itself, there are still considerably more questions than answers. [video shows facility in middle distance and close up, two men in uniform taking readings in the open]

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[Deryugin to camera] Despite the Shikhany facility's powerful scientific and production base and the size of its test range, it does not even feature in the draft state program for chemical weapon destruction. The military blame the Greens for this, saying that they have frightened the local population and authorities with possible consequences of the process of chemical weapon destruction. The Greens in turn suspect that the military have their own plans for Shikhany's future.

While the debate goes on about the best choice of technologies and sites for the destruction of the toxins, Shikhany's population of 15,000 exists without a normal water supply. Nor does the settlement have the status of a special facility which would mean certain privileges for the population, whose future looks singularly bleak. [50545] [video shows facility in middle distance and close up, men in uniforms taking readings inside the test range; environmentalist putting up sign outside the range, a laboratory scene, footage of residential district]

Violation of Chemical, Biological Weapons Accords Denied

MK0511094094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 2

[Report by Ignat Lebyadkin in the "Diplomacy" column: "The United States Has Accused Russia of Failing To Observe Chemical and Biological Weapon Treaties. The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Has Confirmed Its Commitment to the Letter and Spirit of the Existing Agreements"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the U.S. magazine DEFENSE NEWS, the U.S. Senate has postponed the question of approving the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition and Destruction of Chemical Weapons partly owing to the fact that Russia is not honoring the current treaties on chemical and biological weapons. The paper cites memos prepared by the U.S. National Security Council jointly with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Senate Special Intelligence Committee.

In this connection SEGODNYA's correspondent has asked a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official, who is in charge of these matters, for comment.

According to the diplomat, there are two documents on Russian-U.S. accords in the area of chemical weapons prohibition: the 1989 Memorandum of Understanding and the 1990 Agreement on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons. These documents provide a two-way mechanism through which Russia and the United States deal with problems arising in the process of liquidating chemical arsenals, including those pertaining to provisions of the multilateral convention. Active and intense work is also conducted within the framework of the Hague-based Organization on Banning Chemical Weapons.

Naturally, both sides may have other questions for each other which are to be resolved in the process of discussion as part of this mechanism. There must be no doubts about Russia's adherence to the spirit and letter of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, and also the agreement on building confidence in this area

which exists and operates in practice between Russia, the United States, and Great Britain. "We have repeatedly, including at the top level, confirmed our position on these matters," the Russian diplomat said.

Tightening of Nonproliferation Regime Urged

95WP0021A Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 10, Oct 94 [Signed to press 20 Sep 94] pp 8-17

[Article by Oleg Grinevskiy, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet representative to talks on nuclear testing, nonproliferation, conventional arms reductions and security in Europe: "The Outlook for Nonproliferation: An Attempt To Look Beyond 1995"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The far-reaching social and economic changes of recent years have had a particularly strong effect on the state of global and regional security. But strange as it may seem, they have influenced the approach to nuclear weapons nonproliferation least of all.

The security sphere has changed in every respect—the role of nuclear and conventional weapons, the factor of containment, the combination of security and stability, the role and place of regional conflicts. Old threats are becoming a thing of the past, giving way to new challenges. What arouses fear is no longer nuclear war but regional conflicts fomented by aggressive nationalism, with nuclear weapons as a potential military-political factor.

Progress in science and technology makes it easier both to develop and spread nuclear weapons. In the late 1960s, when the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was concluded, there was just a handful of "near-nuclear" countries; today the number of countries capable of developing nuclear weapons is close to 30. By the end of this century and in the first decade of the next, practically all countries will have such an ability. Regional instability and transparent borders are certain to greatly facilitate the spread of nuclear materials, weapon components and production technologies. Besides, practically every graduate of a physical department specialising in nuclear problems will be in a position to design a nuclear charge.

This is not the scenario of Doomsday by the end of this century but rather a real picture of emerging challenges. Growing along with the danger of the appearance of more countries possessing nuclear weapons is the threat of nuclear terrorism in various forms, primarily on the part of ultranationalist formations.

Does the ongoing debate on nonproliferation take these new realities into consideration? The impression it occasionally makes is that those engaged in it are concerned with the technical aspect of extending the Nonproliferation Treaty at the 1995 conference rather than with adjusting it to the harsh realities of today.

There is no reason to doubt that the conference will extend the treaty. Practically all signatories realise the importance and necessity of the nonproliferation regime as a guarantee for their own security. Whether the treaty will be extended indefinitely or unconditionally is another matter.

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The issue will bring on a struggle. Russia declares for making the treaty a law of international relations with no fixed term or strings. Outwardly this position does not differ in any way from that upheld by the Soviet Union for decades. But its substance has changed fundamentally.

Formerly the pivot of Soviet policy was to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Germany. Strictly speaking, this was what made the Soviet Union seek a treaty. Along with this, it wanted to prevent the appearance of nuclear weapons in third countries, mainly because it feared that a conflict between them involving the use of nuclear arms might draw in the Soviet Union and United States.

Currently the starting point is different. Russia favours nonproliferation because it needs international stability to be able to carry out democratic and market oriented reforms, meaning primarily stability in the nonproliferation regime itself.

I think this makes it necessary to create a mechanism or prerequisites for adapting the treaty to new realities. A beginning could be made by doing the following:

- evolving as far as possible a common approach to the role of nuclear weapons in today's world and to containment so as to be able to take a stand on nuclear weapons for the coming decades;
- shifting the centre of gravity in ensuring the nonproliferation regime from the global to the regional level;
- working out a more rigid and binding system of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards.

Nuclear Weapons and Containment in Today's World

Shortly after entering the scene in the Cold War atmosphere, the nuclear weapon became a containment factor irrespective of what it was called in Russian or English.

Everything changed in the early 1990s. The huge Soviet empire, built on the ideology of Communist expansion, fell apart. Its successor in the area of nuclear weapons—Russia—is effecting radical democratic and market reforms and is determined to join the world community. It has declared that it does not regard any country as an adversary. The Cold War is over. But what to do about nuclear weapons? Does the concept of containment retain its role?

The answer to the former question seems clear. Under START 2, the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States are to be cut by 3,000-3,500 units. This is a cardinal decision. At the height of the Cold War, the two countries had 33,000-34,000 warheads apiece. By the time the treaty was signed, each retained roughly 20,000 warheads.¹

What is also important to note is that to be destroyed for the first time are nuclear warheads, not carrier vehicles alone. No earlier agreements covered them, the concept of threat being seen in a different light. From SALT 1 on, the decisive criterion was the number of warheads mounted on vehicles and capable of hitting the adversary in one launch. This explains why reserve means of delivery and warheads

placed in storage facilities were of secondary importance, having no share in a first strike. And it is rather difficult to ascertain their number.

In short, the tenfold cut in nuclear armouries compared with the crucial Cold War period was a revolutionary development. Nevertheless, 3,500 units of nuclear weapons are a formidable force. And what about containment? Does it retain its significance and role now that one-time enemies call each other friends and partners? If so, against whom?

The concept of containment is practically unchanged in NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] position. It names no adversary. In this context the new Russian military doctrine is a replica of the NATO concept. "The goal of the Russian Federation's policy on nuclear weapons," it says, "is to eliminate the danger of nuclear war by containing aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies."²

This obviously creates a situation transplanted to us from Kafka's novels, as it were. There is no enemy, no face-off, no cold war, and yet there remain nuclear weapons in quantities enough for Russia and the United States to destroy each other, let alone other countries. The concept of containment stands, but because there are no enemies, it is the nuclear weapon itself that becomes the object of containment. In other words, weapons contain weapons.

It may be argued that the situation in Russia is unstable and so it is too early for a decision on what to do about the nuclear weapon.

I agree that in the equation of global security Russia will long remain an unknown quantity. One can visualise diverse patterns of behaviour on the part of so vast a country depending on one's imagination and what one knows about the situation there. And of course, political analysts cannot discount either the alternative of a reversal in favour of an aggressively nationalist type of dictatorship and hence of a struggle at global and regional levels or the breakup of the country into independent regions possessing nuclear weapons to one degree or another or capable of making them.

But the worst that can be forecast is not so much an invasion of the West by "Soviet tanks" as a recurrence of the Yugoslav drama in the ex-Soviet Union. The result would be tens of millions of refugees, disasters in major nuclear, chemical and industrial complexes, a threat of unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.

Still, the most likely trend is a continuation of Russia's present evolution that, while difficult and painful, points in the direction of democratic and market oriented reforms.

Besides, it is not until January 2003 that the total number of nuclear weapons units is to go down to 3,000-3,500. There should be clarity about many things by then. But even with the worst scenario, the fewer weapons there are in the situation mentioned above, the better for Russia and the world.³

To build security at both global and regional levels, it is necessary under any circumstances to see the future of

nuclear weapons. This is also indispensable for the 1995 conference, which is to decide the fate of the Nonproliferation Treaty. All who attend it will understandably want to look beyond 1995 and estimate the outlook for their own security with due regard to the role which nuclear weapons are going to play in the future world.

I therefore believe this calls for an exhaustive multistage discussion by all countries, primarily the nuclear powers themselves.

Nuclear weapons and the concept of containment are probably still necessary, except that the substance and trend of the concept should be in keeping with the real dangers threatening humanity. If the Cold War is a thing of the past, nuclear weapons should not serve as a means of containment of its ghosts. The new challenge we face is the appearance of states and regimes committed to aggressive nationalism and prepared to use the nuclear weapon as a means of achieving their objectives. It may be described for simplicity's sake as the appearance of nuclear adventurers, meaning that the situation is close to the one already registered in the Persian Gulf. It is obviously against them that there has been a definite arsenal of nuclear means of containment.

But this does not necessitate keeping several thousand nuclear warheads, for it is quite enough to keep several dozen, all the more so because some combat tasks, which earlier had been expected to require the use of nuclear weapons, can now be fulfilled by using high-precision weapons. It follows that ultimately all remaining nuclear weapons may be put under the command of the United Nations and used by decision of the Security Council. To be sure, this will not be easy to achieve; it will take time and necessitate overcoming national prejudice and egoism but is apparently the best way.

This conception of containment could make the solution of a number of problems related to nuclear weapons easier.

A comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests. To contain enemies comparable to the United States and Russia in the past, that is, to countries commanding sophisticated military technologies, it is indispensable to steadily improve and modernise nuclear weapons. These cannot be made without testing. There is no need to improve nuclear weapons as a means of containing nuclear adventurers. The level attained to date is more than enough. No testing of nuclear weapons is needed, and it can be stopped without detriment to the security of any country.

Lowering the level of the combat readiness of nuclear weapons by undocking the greater part of nuclear warheads from their carrier vehicles.

Speeding up the process of nuclear disarmament that has begun and bringing other nuclear powers into it.

Gradually transforming the nonproliferation regime into an indispensable and binding attribute of international behaviour. In cases threatening peace and security, the UN Security Council could even decide to introduce an obligatory nonproliferation regime into some countries or regions under IAEA control.

If goals close to these and going beyond 1995 could be set, this would help considerably in extending the Nonproliferation Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally.

Regional Aspects of Nonproliferation

In addition to the five nuclear powers, there are now three groups of countries causing concern from the point of view of nonproliferation.

—Countries already possessing nuclear weapons but refusing to admit this formally. These include Israel, India, Pakistan and possibly some others.

—“Threshold” countries, which have a technological and scientific potential for the development of nuclear weapons and have adopted a relevant political decision. This last reservation is very important. For instance, Germany and Japan, which do have such a potential, have explicitly renounced nuclear weapons and done much to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They set an example showing that a country can win considerable political and economic leverage in the world even without nuclear weapons.

—“Near-threshold” countries, which have adopted a programme for the development “or acquisition” of nuclear weapons but still lack an adequate scientific and technological potential.

It is apparently these three groups of countries that may constitute a zone of particular risk from the point of view of proliferating and eventually using nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons of mass destruction have already been used—it happened during the Iran-Iraq war. There was a strong likelihood of Iraq using mass destruction weapons in the Gulf War as well.

The probability of MDW's [expansion not given], including nuclear ones, being used in local crises of the traditional type is increasing noticeably. In the event of an armed conflict between, say, India and Pakistan, things might go beyond using conventional weapons. This would depend on the trend of hostilities. While neither country confirms that its army is equipped with nuclear weapons, spokesmen for both forecast that as soon as such weapons appear on one side, the other will rise to the same level.⁴

In these circumstances it is important to look into the motives inducing countries to seek possession of nuclear weapons. Many of them have to do with long-standing regional conflicts due to ethnic discord and territorial claims having deep historical roots.

First, the motive of “victory,” a bid to achieve quick and overwhelming success in an armed conflict.

Second, the motive of “containment,” the hope that a nuclear capability will discourage the adversary from launching an armed attack.

Third, the motive of an “extreme measure,” that is, recourse to nuclear weapons when, during a conflict, there arises the threat of imminent defeat.

Fourth, the motive of “retaliation,” the fear or evidence that the country seen as a potential adversary has developed or is going to develop (obtain) nuclear weapons.

Basically, these motives show in the zone of traditional regional conflicts—the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Korean peninsula—and in most cases there is serious justification for them. It is therefore pointless to urge these countries to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nor is a debate on creating nuclear-free zones likely to help. Nuclear weapons there are the effect, not the cause, of conflict. They have become a component of it, and hence problems involving them can be solved in the context of a comprehensive political settlement in the region with due regard for the concerns of all sides.

A noteworthy example of such a settlement is South Africa's renunciation of nuclear weapons and its joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

A process of political settlement has also begun in the Middle East. And while the territorial problem there is very complicated, it has turned out not to be the most difficult. The hardest nut to crack is the equation "peace for security." Israel fears not so much a tank offensive from the Golan Heights or the valley of the Jordan as the threat of the appearance of nuclear weapons in Iran, Libya and Iraq. The problem of Iraq is apparently regarded as settled. Some Arab countries also have reason to fear Israeli nuclear weapons.

In short, each particular regional crisis has its causes and roots, meaning also the rise of factors related to nuclear weapons. And this implies that each region needs particular ways of settling a crisis. The main thing is to persuade parties to regional conflicts to start talks.

But in addition to old threats at regional level, a new threat has emerged in the form of militant nationalism, which is often tinged with religious extremism. Neither the international community nor the structures set up by it are prepared to deal with them.

The trend towards rampant nationalism seems inevitable as a reaction to curbs on ethnic development in the context of bloc confrontation in Cold War years. But its extreme, aggressive manifestations are dangerous, for in the absence of a political solution there comes a bid to own nuclear weapons as a means of winning or perishing.

On the one hand, the strongest potential threat is posed by the immense Central Asian region, where political instability coupled with troubled economy may provide fertile ground for the triumph of ethnic and religious fanaticism under the influence of neighbours and with their aid. This in turn may result in the appearance of nuclear weapons in the region. Ex-Soviet republics in the region possess some elements of the nuclear cycle, such as uranium mining and enrichment. They have many specialists who have played a part in various stages of the Soviet programme for the development of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, Iran is one of the "near-threshold" countries. All signs are that it is carrying out a military programme for applied nuclear research. And while it ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 and made it possible for the IAEA to inspect its nuclear installations at discretion in February 1992, its leadership's statements about transforming the country into a nuclear power and

information about growing imports of dual-purpose materials and technologies to Iran give cause for concern.⁵

A combination of these potentialities in the context of ethnic and religious extremism is likely to create a new geostrategic situation throughout the Asian region, from Japan to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. It looks as if that is where the most serious challenge to humanity may be presented in the 1990s.

Problems of Eliminating Nuclear Weapons. What To Do About Plutonium?

These are all entirely new problems that had no relation to the issue of nonproliferation before. A new turn in world developments is telling on this too.

By the terms of START 2 Russia will have to dismount and dismantle about 8,000 nuclear warheads. Coupled with tactical nuclear warheads, the ammunition to be destroyed will total 17,000-18,000 units.⁶ A comparable number of warheads is to be dismantled by the United States. This poses the following problems.

1. Dismantling nuclear ammunition is an extremely dangerous and labor-intensive operation. As a rule, it must be done at the same plants and by the same specialists as had assembled them. This not only makes the operation safe but keeps nuclear specialists busy, thereby preventing to a considerable degree what would be a brain drain. Specialists estimate that six or seven nuclear warheads a day can be dismantled at the most, that is, only 1,500-2,000 a year.
2. At present the worst bottleneck, as far as dismantling in Russia is concerned, is the lack of up-to-date storage facilities for fissionable uranium and plutonium. It is planned to build in Siberia a facility that would ensure reliable, safe and environmentally clean storage. Elements of uranium and plutonium weighing five to eight kilograms are to be put in special metal receptacles that will in turn be sealed in air-tight steel containers filled with an inert gas. But such facilities are costly, nor would an only facility be enough. All this calls for international financial support.
3. Russia's and America's nuclear warheads subject to dismantling contain roughly 1,000 tonnes of plutonium and 500 tonnes of high-enriched uranium (HEU). It is imperative to prevent:
 - their reuse in nuclear weapons;
 - their legal or illegal transfer to other countries as a means of developing weapons.

From the scientific and technological point of view, using HEU poses no problem. Over 90 percent of weapons-grade HEU is made up of U 235 isotopes whereas natural uranium contains a mere 0.7 percent of it. A technology has been evolved that makes it possible to use HEU by diluting it with natural uranium to a 3-4 percent concentration and making it unfit for weapons. But it can be used for producing fuel elements for NPP [nuclear power plant] reactors.

4. Plutonium, however, presents scientific, technological as well as political problems. The reader may know that

no such element exists in nature and that it is produced artificially, by irradiating uranium 238 with neutrons in ordinary reactors. Besides weapons-grade plutonium available to nuclear powers, there is plutonium produced in reactors, and this in nonnuclear countries as well. Currently spent fuel in neutral countries contains 200 tonnes of plutonium, and by the end of the century there will be up to 500 tonnes.

Until recently it was held that reactor plutonium cannot be used in nuclear warheads. But research done by American scientists and an experimental blast carried out in Nevada show that it can serve as a nuclear explosive. True, such warheads are more intricate in design and have a considerable radioactive background. But their explosion produces an effect similar to that of the explosion of a standard nuclear warhead.

The question arises: What to do about plutonium? A debate has started in the international scientific community. Some scientists regard plutonium as a "curse called down on humanity for its nuclear sins." They therefore propose various alternatives for destroying it through vitrification and subsequent burial at nuclear burial sites. They also suggest destroying it through nuclear blasts in deep-lying underground cavities.

Others take the view that there is no justification whatever for the destruction of so costly an energy carrier. They consider that it is necessary to store it under strict international control and join efforts to develop cost-effective and safe reactors using plutonium fuel. Incidentally, Russia has long been doing research to develop reactors that would use a mixed uranium/plutonium fuel, such as is used, for instance, by reactors on fast neutrons (BN-350 and BN-600).

The international programme for the construction of plutonium breeder reactors has virtually been frozen because breeder-generated electricity costs twice as much as electricity produced by NPPs. Nevertheless, Japan's power industry places its hopes for the future in precisely plutonium and is engaged in developing a full nuclear cycle and stockpiling plutonium, whose reserves are expected by specialists to vary between 80 and 90 tonnes by 2010. It is this programme that causes concern about Japan's status as a nonnuclear country.

5. The United States has stopped producing nuclear materials for warheads. The Soviet Union stopped producing HEU as far back as 1989. Nine of Russia's 13 reactors serving to produce plutonium have been stopped. By 1996 there will be only two left in working condition. All production of weapons-grade plutonium is to end by 2000, seeing that the remaining reactors also serve as a source of electricity for some cities and that alternative sources must be created before these reactors are decommissioned.

In view of the foregoing, it might be useful to sign a global agreement on banning production of fissionable materials for military purposes, with not only Russia and the United States, which have taken this road, but China, France and Britain as signatories.

Tightening the Control and Inspection Regime

This subject is dealt with comprehensively enough in special analyses timed to coincide with the 1995 conference. They offer many ways to strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty and the IAEA system of safeguards. This prompts me to make some general remarks.

In Geneva and New York in 1967-1968, our U.S. colleagues and we searched for formulas covering under Articles I and II all likely ways in which nuclear weapons could be proliferated. We began by trying to list them. But while we used heaps of paper and spent a lot of time, there always came out a technique of proliferation that we had overlooked, something like " $N + 1$," the mathematical infinite quantity. In the end we decided to desist from listing and to find a general formula covering all thinkable and unthinkable ways of proliferation.

This was done in the overlapping commitments laid down in Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The nuclear-weapon powers bound themselves not to transfer to anyone—and nonnuclear-weapon countries, not to accept from anyone—nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over them directly or indirectly. Accordingly, nonnuclear-weapon countries committed themselves not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices, and not to seek or receive any assistance in their manufacture.

Today it is again proposed that these provisions of the treaty be concretised to ensure that, say, the commitment "not to manufacture" nuclear weapons explicitly includes a total ban on their manufacture, meaning also the conduct of R&D, the development of components of ammunition, and so on.

All this is certainly well. But even this clarification cannot block every likely road to or stage of nuclear weapons production. And what is not legally banned is considered permitted. This takes us in point of fact back to the same debates as were held in the late 1960s, when the treaty was being drafted. We therefore had better let the formulation "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire" be, seeing that it covers everything.

This also applies in effect to Article III (on control). It is occasionally criticised for being restricted to control over nuclear materials.

I must say that from the first there was a desire to make control more pervasive by extending it to the likely sphere of arms production and, in general, to whatever could have a relation to their development or acquisition. In the end, however, the criterion that was adopted came to be what could really be monitored, and this without detriment to the normal commercial and industrial activities of nuclear enterprises.

Viewed from this angle, the formula of Article III remains preferable. It provides for control over the entire cycle of the movement of nuclear fissionable materials, a cycle underlying any nuclear weapon.

The IAEA system of safeguards is something different. It ought to be geared to developing countries, as it were. The

agency's appropriations for safeguards show that 60 percent of expenditures goes to Germany and Japan. Canada accounts for 10 percent, with Belgium, Sweden, Spain, the Czech Republic and Slovakia getting less and less—in that order. They all have a most industrially developed nuclear cycle but are not classed among countries seeking to possess nuclear weapons for all that they have the potential needed to develop them.

At the same time, IAEA cannot by virtue of the rules in force devote greater attention to other countries, especially in Asia, which have a less developed nuclear cycle but regarding which there is indirect evidence that they can develop nuclear weapons. In other words, the IAEA system of safeguards needs to be amended if it is to play a bigger role in detecting covert production or acquisition of nuclear weapons.

To this end it is primarily necessary to tighten the whole system of IAEA inspections. For one thing, the agency can carry out special inspections only on receiving authentic information about an infringement of safeguards. This makes inspections extraordinary events, all but an affront to the honour and dignity of the country involved. Besides, when an effort is made to establish the authenticity of information, there occurs a considerable delay between the time a request for inspection is made and the actual arrival of an inspection team.

It follows that the existing system of IAEA safeguards should be supplemented by inspections of suspect sites, as envisaged by a number of agreements on confidence-building, security and disarmament measures in Europe.

Summing up, there is reason to draw the following conclusion. The present approach to nuclear nonproliferation calls for a serious revision with due regard to the scientific, technological and political challenges of the future. Participation in the Non-Proliferation Treaty so far has been purely optional. By the end of the century the nonproliferation regime should become a law of the world community binding on all countries. How and in what forms this should be done, including the issue of international sanctions against violators, is a matter that both official spokesmen for countries and specialists ought to decide through debate. In short, the policy of nuclear weapons nonproliferation followed in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s must give way at the end of the century to a new policy that I would describe as "counterproliferation," or active resistance to proliferation.

Footnotes

1. See BULLETIN of the ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, June 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993; July/August 1990, 1991, 1992.
2. IZVESTIA, November 18, 1993.
3. I do not here consider the situation surrounding Russian nuclear weapons sited in Ukraine because I do not expect it to last beyond 1995. What is going on is routine diplomatic bargaining, which is more like bargaining in an oriental bazaar, and it should not be long before the price for the withdrawal of the weapons from Ukraine is set. Belarus and Kazakhstan have already joined the Nonproliferation Treaty.

4. *Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki R.F. Novy vyzov posle kholodnoi voyny: rasprostraneniye oruzhia massovogo unichtozheniya* (Russian Federation External Intelligence Service. A New Challenge after the Cold War: Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons), Moscow, 1993, p. 6.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 89-90.

6. SEGODNYA, December 17, 1993.

7. *Ibid.*

Navy Denies Rumors on Sale of Cruiser to India
LD0311195394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1857 GMT 3 Nov 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Kozmin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—A spokesman for the Russian Navy denied today media reports on India's intention to purchase the Russian aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral Gorshkov", which may become a flag-ship of the Indian Navy. This question has not been so far discussed with the Russian Navy officials, TASS learnt from the Navy's external relations department.

Rumors have been circulated on the eve of the Moscow visit of K.A. Nambiar, secretary of the Indian Defence Ministry. Nambiar has come to Moscow for talks with the Russian military and defence industry officials, including representatives from state company "Rosvooruzheniye".

The company management refused to comment ongoing negotiations with the Indian high-ranking officer, although they did not deny that the purchase of the cruiser "might have been discussed".

According to sources close to leadership of the Russian defence industry, the Indian Government "has decided to buy this ship", but "it is too early to speak about concluding the deal."

Apart from discussing prospects for this deal, India is said to consider possibilities of purchasing several Russian "Kilo"-type submarines, the more so that Pakistan is going to buy three "Agosta"-type submarines under a September agreement with France. Sources close to India's Defence Ministry believe India's purchasing Russian submarines will restore an Indian-Pakistani parity at sea.

According to certain data, Nambiar is also going to negotiate prospects for purchasing 18-20 military MiG-29 planes and just as many "Su-30" fighters. Russia has never exported these aircraft before.

It is also probable that the Indian top military official has come to Russia to "explore" the situation and will not sign any contracts. Anyway, his visit, as well as the recent Russian trip of Admiral V.S. Shekhavat, chief of staff of the Indian Navy, confirms India's interest in the Russian defence production.

Official Cover-Up in 'Red Mercury' Affair Alleged
 95WP0008A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by Boris Slavin: "'Red Mercury': A State Secret, or the Scandal of the Century?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In April 1993 PRAVDA published an article entitled "Yeltsingate" which presented sensational documents, including some signed by the president, concerning deals involving "red mercury." Even just a few of those documents would have been sufficient to bring about the government's resignation in any civilized country. But, as they say, that is "for them"—"for us" this was not even an incident. The government simply pretended that nothing of importance had happened, and the "democratic" press, as if on command, dropped the matter.

However, the documents were and still are of considerable interest, typifying as they do the style and nature of operations by the ruling regime. Specifically, of particular interest is Russian Presidential Directive No. 75-RPS, issued on 21 February 1992, granting a certain company called "Promekologiya" a monopoly on the right to manufacture, purchase, store, transport, supply and sell "red mercury" both for rubles and convertible currency within the limits of an annual export quota of 10 metric tons. I would remind the reader that the value of red mercury on the world market greatly exceeds the price of gold, and ranges from \$320 to \$380 for a single gram.

I was greatly surprised to read one day in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that the "red mercury" case had been staged, if memory serves, by A. Rutskoy, and that the prosecutor had dropped the case on the grounds that no such product actually exists.

How can it be, I thought, that the product does not exist, yet numerous Russian companies are selling it abroad? The product does not exist, yet many countries around the world are eager to buy it. Last of all, the product does not exist, yet a presidential directive regarding the Promekologiya firm does. Is it really that easy to fool the president?

Something does not add up here. And when something does not add up in politics, i.e., does not seem to have a rational explanation, then that means that the deal is not clean, and that means that what we have here is either a highly important state secret (as indicated by the classification stamps on many of the documents that have been examined) or a scandal.

A Sinister Range of Applications

Pondering the "red mercury" issue, I concluded that it is not so much of a scientific-technical as of a political nature, with clear evidence of criminal overtones. It also demonstrates how and by what means the new government is attempting to establish itself, by taking control of structures connected with the production of secret weapons and exports of strategic raw materials for subsequent sale abroad. This in part explains why press coverage of this is undesirable for many of the individuals involved.

However, let us start at the beginning. How and when did the "red mercury" issue first surface? To answer those questions, let us turn to an explanatory memorandum

entitled "On the Issue of Red Mercury," dated 16 March 1992 and sent personally by Ye. Primakov, director of the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, to G. E. Lurbulis, Russian Federation state secretary and first deputy chairman of the Russian Government. The contents of this confidential source indicate that in recent years there has been a sharp upsurge in interest in "red mercury" on the part of small intermediary companies, which have attempted to purchase it without revealing the reasons for their interest or the end user. In my opinion, there could be two reasons: the first is the profitability of the product, which businessmen always conceal, citing commercial secrecy; and the second is the purely military and secret realm in which it is used.

Indicating the second reason, Ye. Primakov plainly writes that the main uses for "red mercury" are: "the manufacture of high-precision detonators for conventional bombs; nuclear reactor start-up; manufacture of anti-radar coatings for military equipment; manufacture of self-guided warheads for high-accuracy missiles to destroy specific targets."

"According to information which will require further verification, the substance can also be used in other advanced technologies not known in our country (the manufacture of super-speed electronic components and special types of paper for use in currency, separation of gold from soil and industrial wastes, etc.)."

Judging by this range of possible "red mercury" applications alone it is clear that this material is of strategic importance and that its production and storage should be highly classified, because there are many countries that do not possess this product but are interested in it. That includes countries that sponsor international terrorism. The removal of literature on the subject of mercury enrichment from U.S. libraries since 1988 and the interest shown in the subject by major companies such as Rockwell, General Dynamics, Westinghouse and others confirm that assumption. It is further reinforced by the fact that the first synthesis of "red mercury," or mercuric antimonite, $Hg_2Sb_2O_7$, in the USSR was carried out in 1968 and for many years was not duplicated by anyone. In the opinion of nuclear experts, outside of Russia there is only one accelerator, located at the European Nuclear Research Center (CERN) in Switzerland, that could be used for that purpose.

An Insatiable Hunger for Profit

Despite strict secrecy surrounding the production, storage and transportation of "red mercury," in recent years a large flow of it abroad through various commercial firms, both domestic and foreign, has been reported. The end users are major companies in the United States and France that are working in the fields of nuclear weapons production and the aerospace industry, as well as South Africa, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Libya and other countries striving to acquire nuclear weapons.

"Red mercury" has often been offered abroad by dubious individuals calling themselves businessmen, consultants, experts, etc. Some of them have been prosecuted for attempting the illegal importation of this strategical material into a foreign country. For example, there was the case

against three Russian citizens in Italy. It is also known that "red mercury" has been unofficially purchased in Russia and then resold in the United States by various foreign and domestic intermediaries. For example, this material has been repeatedly resold in the United States by the Indra Company of Hungary with the aid of our own Intermed-servis Joint Venture, the Melitit Company of Austria and others. Investigation of possible trading in "red mercury" inside Russia has been undertaken by the Litsenzmet Company, a part of Litsenzintorg VVO, in conjunction with the Simako Concern and others. In this article we will not list the names of those who head these companies.

There have also been reports of a considerable number of offers of "red mercury" from those familiar with the Moscow exchanges. Between 23 January and 5 February 1992 the records of the Russian Commodities and Raw Materials Exchange listed six offers in connection with "red mercury," no price indicated. Recently there has been a considerable increase in inquiries from foreign companies wishing to purchase "red mercury."

As you can see, confidential information from the Russian Security Service leaves no doubt as to the existence of the product called "red mercury." Furthermore, it is stressed that genuine "red mercury" must be differentiated from fake versions made from cinnabar. Real "red mercury" is transported in the standard lead ampoules designed for the shipment of radioactive materials and mercury, weighing approximately 30 kilograms and containing a 5-gram sample.

The fact that "red mercury" is not fictitious is confirmed by various documents from official sources. Specifically, by a letter from M. L. Katkov, deputy chairman of Atomenergoeksport VVO, dated 4 February 1992, requesting "a report on the specifications for Merkuriy-brand 'red mercury' with a specific gravity of 20/20"; by a letter from A. S. Anisin, deputy chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblast government, dated 28 January 1992 and addressed to Ye. T. Gaydar, requesting "assistance in obtaining a permit to purchase 'red mercury' manufactured at enterprises in the oblast, with the right of subsequent sale thereof to the IBC Company (Tallinn)." A similar request was contained in a letter sent to Gaydar on 19 February 1992 by one M. Amirkhanov, director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Sochi Research Center. However, more substantial evidence that "red mercury" exists is provided by materials and documents connected with the operations of the Promekologiya Concern and its president, O. F. Sadykov.

A Monopoly Under the Guise of Reform

Judging by letters from O. Sadykov to the "highly esteemed" state secretary of the Russian Federation, Gen-nadiy Eduardovich Burbulis, this little-known but experienced and skillful businessmen set himself the goal of cutting out state structures in the military-industrial complex and the Ministry of Security from all dealings with "red mercury" and concentrating all operations involving it in his own hands, from production to sale abroad. Specifically, in a letter dated 10 January 1992 he wrote to his protegee, applying pressure to his weak points. "It is

very important to remove completely from these operations the former ministerial structures of the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building and the USSR MAEP [no expansion given]." In another letter, dated 2 April 1992, he says: "According to expert estimates, as many as 80 percent of former officers of the KGB's PGU [First Main Directorate] involved with red mercury operations have now transferred to the Russian Ministry of Security and will hamper any investigation of past events. With regard to red mercury our Ministry of Security is not reliable."

In order to achieve his goal, O. Sadykov appealed in his letters to state interests and promised top-level leaders fabulous profits totalling \$15-20 billion annually.

O. Sadykov was clearly well acquainted with his correspondent's way of thinking. He tried to prove to him the necessity of concentrating in one set of hands (meaning the Promekologiya Concern's) a monopoly right to manufacture and sell "red mercury," promising that the funds received from such sales would finance a powerful "Russian technological breakthrough," without which there would be no way to overcome the present crisis. He wrote: "A trial breakthrough is vitally essential if the broad masses are to have confidence in tomorrow, and to ensure broad public support for the reforms being carried out in Russia by the federal government."

O. Sadykov's demagoguery did the trick and, as we have already noted, the desired presidential directive was issued. After which O. Sadykov, assured that "red mercury" was not a myth, but indeed a real product, demanded the immediate rescinding of "previous instructions" preventing plants from giving "red mercury" to his Promekologiya Concern. "Otherwise," he wrote, "officials can continue to disinform the Russian Government and pretend that red mercury does not exist."

He once again promised profits from its sale, now in the amount of \$40 billion, and requested that his sales quota be increased by a factor of more than three. He ended his letter to G. Burbulis on 2 April 1992 with this typical passage: "I deem it extremely essential to immediately commence the practical implementation of Russian Federation Presidential Directive No. 75-RPS. Further delay can only benefit those who oppose Russia's revitalization and its reformist leaders." In a postscript to this letter he heightens the alarmist tone, exclaiming: "We must immediately place this 'mysterious' red mercury at Russia's service. Everything is ready on our end."

As we can see, at this point Sadykov puts the word "mysterious" in quotation marks. That can only mean one thing: that he knows that "red mercury" is not a myth, it is a reality, because he knows who actually produces it.

History does not tell what followed this letter. It remains unclear whether Sadykov gave to Russia the promised \$40 billion for the purpose of successfully implementing reforms, or whether like so many of his colleagues he deposited the money in European and American banks. Did he sell the "red mercury" just to "civilized countries," or also to those which support international terrorism? Finally, were the promised billions of dollars a reality or just a bluff that allowed O. Sadykov to use "red mercury"

as a cover to win the official right to transport and sell abroad without hindrance certain strategic materials and other valuable products? There is no answer to these questions, but we are fully aware that thus far Russia has not made any "technological breakthrough," and that the reforms being carried out by the reformers are leading it further and further down a dead-end road.

What Alarmed the President and Gaydar

Perhaps in view of this, or perhaps for other reasons, exactly one year later Russia's president issued another directive entitled "On the Promekologiya Concern," No. 188-RPS, rescinding his previous directive. His motives for doing so are not clear. Did this new directive acknowledge the bankruptcy of the Promekologiya Concern, or was it merely an official closure of a company that in fact continue to exist, channelling dollars to certain members of the country's highest leadership? As the saying goes, we are not accountable for anything, but the money keeps coming in!

It is curious that the president issued his new directive regarding the concern literally on the eve of his famous introduction of OPUS [special procedure for governing the country] in the country. Was that a coincidence? If not, then what was it that frightened the president—the possibility of unnecessary disclosures? They happened anyway. Not just the newspapers started talking about "red mercury," but Vice-President Rutskoy as well.

I recall how he brought up the subject in a televised debate with Ye. Gaydar and how the latter skillfully evaded the issue, shifting to a safer discussion of gold and diamonds. Since by that time PRAVDA had already published the contents of many documents pertaining to "red mercury," I decided to ask Ye. Gaydar about it directly. The interview took place in June 1993, half an hour before the opening of the infamous constitutional convention. First we talked a while about his grandfather, then we moved on to "red mercury." Gaydar was alarmed by this. The following is an abridged version of my tape recording of the interview:

Slavin: Yegor Timurovich, in a television discussion with A. Rutskoy you basically avoided discussing the "red mercury" issue. PRAVDA recently published the contents of several documents and materials which indicate that you were informed about it. What do you have to say about the issue?

Gaydar: I would be happy to take a look at those documents.

Slavin: You can take a look at them.

Gaydar: Send them to me.

Slavin: You are aware that by directive of B. Yeltsin the service dealing with "red mercury" was dissolved on 20 March, the day of his televised appearance?

Gaydar: What service?

Slavin: Promekologiya.

Gaydar: That's not a service, it's a company.

Slavin: Agreed, but that does not change the substance of the issue. Does that mean that as soon as there are documents, you will comment on them?

Gaydar: I will be glad to give you my comments.

Slavin: Well, in your opinion, are there no such documents?

Gaydar: No. My opinion is that there is no such thing as "red mercury"... I brought up the issue with the Ministry of Security and the Academy of Sciences, and they assured me that "red mercury" does not exist.

Slavin: Fine, so you will provide your comments if we present you with documents concerning "red mercury"?

Gaydar: Of course.

The Color of Our Country's 'Panama'

There you have it, readers. Judge for yourself. The president believes that there is such a product as "red mercury," and issues a directive regarding its utilization by the Promekologiya Concern. The Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service speaks through its director to the Russian Federation state secretary about its existence and its possible uses. There is a similar memorandum entitled "On The Export of 'Red Mercury,'" addressed to the president of the Russian Federation and dated 4 April 1992, No. NYe-913, signed by N. A. Yermakov, chairman of the Russian Federation Presidential Committee for the Protection of the Economic Interest of the Russian Federation, which not only confirms the principal applications for "red mercury" but also flatly states that "red mercury" could be used as a cover for the export of other, more expensive radioactive materials, monitoring of the export procedure for which is at this time still inadequate."

It appears that Ye. Gaydar is aware of this memorandum, since on 7 April 1992 he directed an inquiry to the Russian Academy of Sciences (Ye. P. Velikhov) requesting that it to "look into" the matter in conjunction with the Russian Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Atomic Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Russian State Tariff Committee. Following consideration of the matter by a group of specialists at the office of deputy minister of industry V. I. Krasnov on 5 May 1992 he began stating that no such product as "red mercury" exists.

Setting aside the fact that experts' authority can be used to spread disinformation, let us concede that "red mercury" does not in fact exist, and that the president, foreign intelligence and other competent agencies misled con men involved in a scandal using "red mercury" as a cover for their own manipulation of strategic materials sales abroad. That version has some foundation, in view of the recent uproar over shipments of fissionable radioactive elements to Germany.

If "red mercury" does not exist, then why should the issue be shrouded in mystery and made into a secret? On the contrary, it should be widely publicized and all the con men and schemers who were using it for their own greedy ends exposed. Otherwise, what will happen is that the authorities, by cooperating with dubious swindlers for a

long period of time, will have thereby facilitated the export of valuable strategic materials.

Another question is also appropriate: where is the money that was received from the sale of the so-called "red mercury," or whatever it conceals?

And so the story of "red mercury" is clearly not complete. Indeed, what is it: a highly important state secret, or the greatest scandal of the 20th century, a scandal to which the ruling regime is closely linked? I think that Ye. Gaydar will help us answer that question.

We are not asking him what happened to the billions that he withdrew from the bank during those tragic days in October; we are not asking him what happened to the CPSU money frozen in bank accounts in Russia. But we do want to get one simple answer: what are we to think about the policy of a ruling regime that has dealings with a modern Chichikov who deals in a non-existent product?

To me, one thing is clear: even if "red mercury" does not exist in nature, it does have a color. But it is the color of the tricolor flag, not that of a party membership card.

Three Smugglers Detained With 67 Kg of Uranium-238 in Pskov

*LD2710133594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1131 GMT 27 Oct 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Vlasov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pskov October 27 TASS—Officers of the Pskov regional department of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FSK] detained three nuclear smugglers the other day in downtown Pskov, who tried to hand over 67 kilograms of radioactive uranium-238 to unidentified persons.

The smugglers were inhabitants of Pskov. Criminal proceedings were initiated against them on the same day.

The Uranium-238 isotope is not used for military purposes, said experts involved in the investigation into the criminal case.

The regional prosecutor's office strives to reveal where the smugglers procured the radioactive material and to whom they intended to sell it.

The latter might be citizens of the former Soviet republics of the Baltics, sources at the Pskov regional FSK department said unofficially.

Customs Officers Seize 160 Tonnes of 'Crude Uranium'

*LD2910085594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0750 GMT 29 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow October 29 TASS—Railway customs officers confiscated nine containers with "crude uranium and its compounds" with a total weight of 160 tonnes at the station of Sol-Iletsk (80 kilometers south of Orenburg) on Friday.

The Russian Ministry for Emergencies announced about it on Saturday.

According to the waybills, the cargo was being delivered from Tajikistan to the United States without a certificate of safety and a permission for a transit across Russia.

Three railway platforms, each loaded with three containers, are being guarded now. Regional authorities formed a commission, which would arrive in Sol-Iletsk on Saturday.

AZERBAIJAN

Azeri Arrested for Plutonium Smuggling

954K0212A Baku ZERKALO in Russian 22 Oct 94 p 2

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Facts, Events, Comments": "Baku Is Becoming a Uranium Marketplace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Thursday the Turkish police arrested Azerbaijani citizen Ramiz Shakhgeldiyev in Istanbul, attempting to sell 750 grams of enriched uranium smuggled out of the republic. An Istanbul police representative told the ANATOLIA Agency (AA) that R. Shakhgeldiyev had crossed the border with Turkey in Igdyr, on the border with Armenia, and then gone to Istanbul, where he attempted to sell uranium for \$60,000. AA reported that the confiscated uranium was identified as uranium 238, suitable for use in nuclear bombs. R. Shakhgeldiyev said that he had purchased the uranium in Baku.

ESTONIA

Strategic Goods Export Control Commission Begins Operations

*WS0111155894 Tallinn Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press
Release in English 1351 GMT 1 Nov 94*

[Report released by Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs via electronic mail—received via Internet E-LIST]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Beginning November 1, the Estonian Border Guard have the right to demand an export license for strategic goods, including weapons and ammunition, goods connected with biological and chemical weapons, and nuclear and nuclear-related technology and materials.

Established under a government order (June 5, 1994), the Estonian Strategic Goods Export Control Commission met for the first time October 31. The Commission operates under the Law of Strategic Goods Export and Transit.

The Strategic Goods Export Control Commission, which is composed of representatives from the Customs Board and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Economic Affairs, and Internal Affairs, will make decisions through consensus.

A government decision of October 5, 1994 confirmed the Strategic Goods Export Control Regulation and the lists of strategic goods. Applications for export licenses are issued by the Foreign Economic Policy Department, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Press and Information Office, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

KAZAKHSTAN

Kasenov on Nuclear Nonproliferation

95WP0014A *Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 15 Oct 94 p 3

[Interview with U. Kasenov, director of the Kazakhstan Strategic Studies Institute under the president of the republic, by Aleksandr Tarakov; place and date not given: "Will the Politicians Display Prudence? What We Will Take to the Conference"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have already reported on the International Conference for an Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty seminar, which was held in Almaty 10-12 October.

Experts are commending the high scientific level of this forum and the good preparation of the Kazakhstani specialists, who were by no means lost in the company of such authorities as David Fisher (formerly deputy director general of the IAEA), Lawrence Scheinman (deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), Harald Mueller (director of international programs of Germany's Peace Institute), and Garik Rauf (Canada's Global Security Center).

In the course of the discussion of complex issues of security guarantees and the positions of the different countries six months prior to the New York meeting, a multitude of problems and contradictions posing a serious threat to the treaty were revealed. One participant in the meeting even asked the following so unexpected a question: How should the present era be described—as postwar or prewar? He responded as follows to the questions seeking clarification. Only now, when the last Russian soldier has been withdrawn from Germany, can we speak about the final conclusion of World War II. At the same time, on the other hand, the nuclear potentials contain the danger of a new global conflict, and mankind is in a state between peace and war.

The scientists, the "strategists of peace," demonstrated in Almaty an almost complete mutual understanding and readiness for consensus. But will prudence be displayed by the politicians—will they be able to extend the peace-making treaty next spring?

U. Kasenov, director of the Kazakhstan Strategic Studies Institute under the president of the republic, granted KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA an interview on the eve of the seminar. And now also, following the conclusion of the international forum, we have found a well-founded argument for an interview with the authoritative analyst. A kind of competent "engagement" before and after the event has resulted.

Tarakov: Umirserik Tuleshovich, is there some symbol or meaning in the fact that respected experts gathered in Almaty for a discussion of most urgent problems of the world order connected with the prospects of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty?

Kasenov: Undoubtedly. Although Kazakhstan is a young state and its independence is far younger than the current

treaty. It was the case that nuclear tests, whose consequences are still having a negative effect on the health of the population, were carried out on the territory of the republic for several decades. We are parting unilaterally with the awesome weapons, but some of them are still on our land. So we have a direct connection with the said problem.

I would mention the following nuance also. On 13 December 1993 the republic acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and next spring it expires. Thus the seminar is an opportunity to publicly confirm our position once again and on the threshold of 1995 to demonstrate our good intentions.

Tarakov: That is, the seminar was held thanks to Kazakhstan's strong initiative?

Kasenov: I would speak of the mutual initiative of two centers—the Kazakhstan Strategic Studies Institute under the president and the Monterey International Research Institute. Our efforts correspond entirely here to the interests of the two countries—the United States and the Republic of Kazakhstan.

This could not have been imagined in earlier times: While in Monterey, we planned this meeting almost a year ahead with our American colleagues without any further referrals.

What aims were being pursued here? This, for example, was what was troubling us. The community and the intellectual milieu in Kazakhstan, by the will of historical destiny a nuclear state, are very superficially initiated in regard to so important a world process. People have little idea how the Nonproliferation Treaty could influence Kazakhstan's future. Something akin to a Torricelli void has taken shape in this sphere. And we deemed it essential to set about enlightening the public consciousness.

The next task is the training of an intellectual elite, specifically, specialists in the sphere of nuclear policy and nonproliferation. I would note that such work has already begun: There have been several scientific trainee stints that have borne good fruit.

Tarakov: It has to be assumed that in the course of the exchange of opinions among the Central Asian, American, and German specialists (representatives of other countries took part in the seminar also) there was additional amplification of the positions in respect to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the versions of its extension. What, as a result, was the general format that you settled on for yourself?

Kasenov: An indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty is advocated by the members of the "nuclear club" (and it is perfectly understandable why: They want to remain monopoly owners of nuclear weapons), the European Union (12 states), Japan, and the members of NATO. A number of states that do not rank as industrially developed and individual participants in the non-aligned movement are affiliated to this group. For geographical reasons, from allied considerations, and for other particular reasons. There are, it is variously estimated, 60-80 countries here.

The second group of states, and quite numerous, is composed mainly of the devotees of a policy of nonalignment. Indonesia, Egypt, and the countries that are in sympathy with them on this issue are against an indefinite and unconditional extension since they want to hold certain instruments of influence on the nuclear powers. The signing of an "everlasting" treaty is for them fraught with the loss of the right to maneuver at this turn of events or the other. This is why these states advocate a 25-year term or fixed periods.

Some countries discern in the treaty an attempt to limit their defensive possibilities. Primarily those that are involved in regional conflicts or that are concerned over the territorial claims on the part of their neighbors. They have not acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, regarding it as a manifestation of diktat on the part of the nuclear states.

And there is one further position, which is demonstrated primarily by the "threshold" states, which are expressing discontent at the existence of a discriminatory division into those that may and those that may not have nuclear weapons. Demands, public or concealed, for a revision of the treaty periodically arise. A direct challenge to nonproliferation is the nuclear activity of a number of states that have not acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Israel, India, Pakistan). As we are learning at the present time, accession to the treaty and IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] supervision are not a sufficiently reliable and efficient condition ensuring that new nuclear states will not emerge. Iraq was very close to the possession of nuclear weapons, and the DPRK set a dangerous precedent by its withdrawal from the treaty (in accordance with Article 10.1, proceeding from the special situation and the "highest interests" of the state).

Tarakov: Now let us switch to Kazakhstan. What will we say in New York?

Kasenov: Kazakhstan's position on the future of the treaty is in the formation phase. There are various viewpoints in the republic. One amounts to support for the position that imparts to the treaty an indefinite nature, preserves its current wording, and reinforces nonproliferation in the traditions of the past 25 years.

But there is another opinion also: Kazakhstan is with its problems close to the third world and should for this reason heed the demands of certain countries concerning security guarantees, discriminatory restrictions in the sphere of technology and raw material imports and exports, IAEA safeguards, and the double-standards policy pursued by the West following the conclusion of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in respect to a number of states. This line of reasoning logically leads to support for the position of the countries which demand the denunciation of the treaty or, at a minimum, serious revisions to it.

Finally, there is in Kazakhstan a compromise viewpoint, which is that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty should be extended for some further definite term.

But, in any event, the republic will shape its position on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on the basis of the accomplishment of its own tasks and the observance of

national interests, which coincide with the general interests of international security. These include such demands as the conclusion of a treaty on a general ban on all nuclear testing; international security guarantees for the nuclear-free states; the equal participation of all parties to the treaty in the monitoring of compliance with the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and observance of IAEA safeguards; support for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as the basis of a system of international security; support for efforts pertaining to general nuclear disarmament.

The following could be key features of Kazakhstan's position:

- a) the demand that security guarantees be accorded the nonnuclear states on the part of the nuclear states;
- b) a complete ban on nuclear testing;
- c) limitation of the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to a term of not more than 25 years;
- d) an increase in the role of the UN Security Council in the reinforcement of nuclear nonproliferation and the assurance of security guarantees for nonnuclear states.

Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are unacceptable from Kazakhstan's viewpoint since this would impede a complete ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. The wording of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty where peaceful explosions are permitted could remain unchanged with a view to their being banned in a future treaty on the complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons.

Kazakhstan recognizes that the strong linkage of the problem of a complete ban on nuclear testing with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty could signify the failure of the conference, as was the case at the interim conference in 1990. Such a failure is clearly not in the interests of the republic. It would be expedient at the conference to raise the question of international aid in the elimination of the consequences of nuclear testing.

We are very interested in support for a strengthening of IAEA safeguards and an increase in its budget to this end. The IAEA could then provide for increased assistance in the conversion of Kazakhstan's nuclear facilities and the development of nuclear power engineering, considering its special position as having sustained the greatest damage from nuclear testing.

As far as the timeframe is concerned, in the event of its indefinite and unconditional extension, the treaty would, in fact, legalize both nuclear weapons themselves and their possession by the five powers.

May the 25-year timeframe be retained? Obviously, yes.

First, it is a great piece of luck that the duration of the treaty selected earlier—25 years—proved very accurate. It expired at a stage of mankind's development when cardinal geopolitical changes have occurred and the cold war and bloc confrontation have ended.

Second, this timeframe could perfectly well be optimally adjusted with the anticipated pace of nuclear disarmament.

Third, the process of the nuclear countries' nuclear disarmament would be under the constant tension of a kind of "peace blackmail" of the "threshold" states.

We could agree to a term of 25 years provided that the intermediate review conferences, which should, as before, be held every five years, be accorded greater authority and that the procedure of amendments to the treaty is facilitated.

On the basis of what has been said, the term of 25 years would seem perfectly acceptable. We could, obviously, as a compromise between the nuclear and nonnuclear states, support the proposal of the American expert George Bunn that the conference adopt a decision on the automatic extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty every 25 years, unless a majority of its participants decides otherwise.

Foreign Ministry Statement on Chinese Nuclear Test

*LD0710181294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1759 GMT 7 Oct 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Akimov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Alma-Aty [Almaty] October 7 TASS—Nuclear tests on the Lob-Nor experimental range in China are "undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime against the background of present realities in the world nuclear policy," a statement by the Foreign Ministry of Kazakhstan says in connection with an atomic explosion on October 7. The text of the statement was released by the KAZTAG agency.

"The nuclear tests on the Lob-Nor proving ground located in close proximity to the Kazakh-Chinese border are fraught with serious damage to the medical-and-biological and technogene environment in the region," the document says.

"China as one of the largest and influential states in the world is bearing a special responsibility for maintaining peace and stability," the statement stresses.

"Kazakhstan would welcome a decision by Chinese leadership to stop nuclear blasts and join in the process of the universal ban on nuclear tests," the document points out.

KYRGYZSTAN

Foreign Ministry Protests Chinese Underground Nuclear Test

*LD0111174794 Bishkek SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA
in Russian 21 Oct 94 p 1*

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting was held between Deputy Foreign Minister T. Chinetov [name as transliterated] and the temporary charge d'affairs of the People's Republic of China to Kyrgyzstan, Chen Dyanchjo [name as transliterated] at the Foreign Ministry during which a statement by the Foreign Ministry was given to the Chinese charge d'affairs in connection with the carrying out of an underground nuclear test on the Lob-Nor test ground.

"According to information received, a regular underground nuclear test was carried out on the Lob-Nor test ground in China on 7 October 1994.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers that nuclear tests have a bad effect on the ecological situation and the health of the population of Kyrgyzstan, a state that directly borders upon the region of China where these tests are carried out.

"The ministry is concerned that the continuation of nuclear tests by China may threaten the observance by other nuclear states of the existing moratorium on nuclear tests.

"We again emphasize the necessity of establishing a joint commission to examine the consequences of nuclear tests on the sites in Semipalatinsk and Lob-Nor.

"Kyrgyzstan, within the framework of the initiative on the creation of a non-nuclear zone in Central Asia that it submitted at the 49th session of the UN General Assembly, supports China's aspiration to achieve the complete destruction and prohibition of nuclear weapons and also a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests, and calls on China to show restraint in future and not resume nuclear tests which will help in the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty."

In his turn the Chinese diplomat handed over the text of a statement on this topic by a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to T. Chinetov.

"On 7 October 1994 China carried out an underground nuclear test.

"China develops and possesses a small nuclear-weapon potential exclusively for the purposes of self-defense. At the same time it is in favor of achieving agreement on the speedy and complete destruction of all nuclear weapons by nuclear states. China always shows great restraint in regard to nuclear tests and the number of nuclear tests carried out in China is less than in other nuclear states.

"We take an active part in the Geneva talks on concluding a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and hope that a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests will be concluded soon, no later than by 1996, through talks. Then China will immediately halt carrying out nuclear tests from the moment when such a treaty comes into force.

"China is always against the policy of nuclear-threats and once more calls on other nuclear states to give an active response to its initiative and immediately begin talks on the conclusion of a treaty on no first use of nuclear weapons against each other and simultaneously reach an agreement on not using, and not threatening to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and zones. This will create favorable conditions for the fastest implementation of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests."

UKRAINE

One Hundred Fifty Kg of Nuclear Substance Smuggled to Europe

WS0710152994 Kiev SAMOSTIYNA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 27 Sep 94 p 5

[Article by UNIAN correspondent Volodymyr Slavchuk:
"Does a Nuclear Mafia Exist?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The number of cases of "nuclear" contraband is growing every month. As many as five have been reported since last May. Radioactive substances are being discovered in garages and planes, confiscated at custom houses and during attempts to sell merchandise to the client. So, does a nuclear Mafia exist? One of the arrested individuals said that as of now, there are at least 150 kilograms of "combat" radioactive substance circulating in Europe. Until recently, an opinion was held that 8 to 10 kg of this substance is required to produce one bomb. But physicists from a West European nongovernment organization declared a couple of days ago that the official safety "threshold" regarding the amount necessary to manufacture a nuclear charge should be brought down to one kilogram. Scientific progress already allows that.

Some more figures: 150 to 170 tonnes of the plutonium stockpile for producing bombs, and more than 1,000 tonnes of concentrated uranium which can also be used in the "business" is generated in Europe. At the end of July 1991, the Soviet Union had 30,000 units of tactical nuclear weapons and at least 1,400 warheads of strategic delivery systems that were stationed outside Russia, including Ukraine.

Since most of the reported cases of smuggling have Moscow origins—German experts think that all radioactive materials were brought from Russia—the West's attention and criticism is primarily targeted at Russia as a state with a widely developed system of nuclear arms, as well as at those CIS countries that, according to international agreements, bring their "own" warheads for dismantling. Ukraine, of course, is among them. The West has recently sent a note on this issue to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry but, as usual, the response was not made public.

The position of the West regarding the CIS in general and Russia in particular is as follows: on the territory of the former Soviet Union, there are dozens of plutonium-producing plants, institutes, laboratories, and depots storing materials that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons. And while the situation was controlled before the country's collapse, also by the KGB, everything has changed now. Disorder has become aggravated, mob structures have become stronger, nuclear scientists and technicians poorer. To make things even worse, the amount of nuclear substances is growing due to the dismantling of warheads. The above factors created a market for this dangerous "production."

For now, Western media talk about the "market of offers," with no buyers detected yet. But who will guarantee that they will not appear in the near future: terrorist groupings or even some states of the Middle East and Asia? After all,

there are numerous reports—not confirmed but not denied—that the smuggling routes are crossed in Pakistan, for example.

Besides, according to some sources (not refuted by the German intelligence service BND), it makes no sense to export more of those materials to Germany—they are already there. Before withdrawing to Moscow, all servicemen, ranging from warrant officers to senior officers, of the Russian Fleet traded in everything, beginning with handguns and ending with tanks. There is no guarantee that this was all they offered. On the other hand, the German newspaper STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN noted that former Stasi agents and East German Army officers can easily deliver nuclear substances from the former Soviet Union. Using their excellent contacts in Russia, Ukraine, and other CIS countries, they are quite capable of covering the entire Europe with a common "atomic" network. As for Russia, it turns out that the fine for violating safety rules for handling nuclear substance is... 100 rubles.

The present situation has dealt a serious blow to Russia's position. It demanded that all nuclear warheads of other CIS countries be dismantled on its territory, arguing that only in Moscow-administered facilities nuclear materials can be under proper control. Now that the West sends Moscow serious rebukes (as occurred, for example, at the recent G-7 summit in Naples), Moscow should admit that there is a wide gap between the "successes" it reported on this issue and reality.

The "underground nuclear market," the "nuclear Mafia"—are terms that only Western media are currently using. However, officials and organizations are more reserved and say that this "process can be stopped" through international cooperation in protecting nuclear substance and its illegal sales. Hopefully, the future will prove this point.

Kuchma Says Kiev Has 'No Grounds Not To Sign NPT'

LD0911172094 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1535 GMT 9 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—"One of the most principal problems facing Ukraine was the restoration of relations with Turkmenistan, which had actually been terminated due to nonpayment of our gas debts (in 1993 the debt stood at 671 million and in 1994 at about 500 million dollars)," Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma said at a news conference on 9 November. According to him, agreements were signed on restructuring Ukraine's debts to Turkmenistan for 1993 with their delay for seven years and an agreement was reached on supplying 28 billion cubic meters of Turkmenistan-produced gas to Ukraine in 1995.

Replying to a question from UNIAN on whether the price for the Turkmenistan-produced gas, which is now 50 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters on Ukraine's border, will be changed, Leonid Kuchma said this issue had not yet been resolved finally.

Also, he said that on 8 November he signed an instruction to check the activities of the "Respublika" corporation, which is paying off Ukraine's debts for oil products. According to him, a decree will be signed this week on setting up financial-industrial groups that will function, in particular, during the purchase of energy sources by the state.

Leonid Kuchma pointed out that the government had been reprimanded for the fact that it did not inform trade unions about that latest decree by the Cabinet of Ministers on price formation. Leonid Kuchma said from now on such documents would be coordinated with trade unions.

Replying to a question on the prospects of a land reform, the president of Ukraine informed those present about the decree signed on the same day that would speed up privatization processes in the countryside.

Touching on the critical assessment of this decree made by the parliament group of communists, the president of

Ukraine emphasized: "One should not make a plenum of the Central Committee or a Rukh leadership sitting out of parliament." Leonid Kuchma believes that the mass communist manifestation on 7 November is evidence of the struggle for power.

As far as Ukraine's accession to the nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty is concerned (the consideration of this issue is scheduled for 11 November), Leonid Kuchma expressed the hope that it would take place. According to him, three commissions of the Supreme Council have already spoken out positively in this connection. "We have no grounds not to sign this treaty," Leonid Kuchma pointed out.

Commenting on the decision by the finance minister of the European Union to postpone the consideration of the issue on granting 85 million ECUs in aid to Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma expressed the conviction that "Europe will take a positive decision."

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

France, Germany To Cooperate in Military Satellite Projects

BR1410143094 Paris LA TRIBUNE DESFOSES
in French 13 Oct 94 p 11

[Report by Olivier Provost: "Paris and Bonn To Cooperate in Military Space Projects"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the coming months, France and Germany should add a new string to the bow of their cooperation in the field of armaments: military space and "space-monitored security" projects. That is the prediction of General Armaments Delegate Henri Conze, who stressed that "a most notable change" had taken hold of the German authorities, who want to "get involved in this space-security aspect."

Discussions between Paris and Bonn started "several months ago." Official announcements in Germany are expected after the 16 October general elections, especially if [Chancellor] Helmut Kohl's budget of several billion marks should be set aside for military space projects. This represents some 30 billion French francs [Fr] in an area where a single major program, such as the future observation and reconnaissance satellite Helios 2, costs Fr10 billion.

According to Henri Conze, "the Germans are not ruling anything out" in this area. They are said to have requirements in space telecommunications and intelligence, whether based on optical, infrared, or radar technologies. French-German working groups are already looking into this. Given the fact that France is further advanced in these space-related domains, the French are awaiting the French-German summit of May 1995 rather than the November meeting before any decisive steps are taken. As Defense Minister Francois Leotard pointed out, "Already at the Mulhouse summit in May we witnessed the signing of a document on the French-German commitment to a satellite Europe."

The French are even envisaging the Germans replacing, in the coming months, their Spanish partner in the recently-launched Helios 2 program. Spain pulled out a short while ago because budget restrictions meant it was unable to find the Fr800 million required for its 7-percent stake in the program.

German Military Budget To Increase

This Paris-Bonn axis in military-space projects could be built on a number of bases. First, in an industrial context, Aerospatiale and the German DASA [Deutsche Aerospace] group, already cooperating in helicopter projects and soon in missile projects, are planning to merge their satellite activities by creating a mixed 50-50 company, based in Munich under a German CEO. Clearly, Germany has major ambitions in this domain.

Second, most defense experts are predicting an increase in Germany's military budget, which has been cut in recent years, especially in the area of investments, due to the ending of the Cold War and reunification costs.

Third, Paris and Bonn are working actively to set up a joint armaments agency, perhaps as soon as 1995, to harmonize programs (helicopters, missiles, transport planes, etc.), research, and "processes." The Belgians and the Dutch could join in at a later stage, thus creating the initial core of a "European armaments agency."

DENMARK

Authorities Increase Nuclear Materials Trafficking Controls

AU1010160194 Paris AFP in English
1344 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] COPENHAGEN, Oct 10 (AFP)—The Danish secret service organization (PET) has increased its checks on merchandise and packages coming from eastern countries to fight nuclear materials smuggling, PET officials said.

Danish authorities have expressed concern that Denmark be used as a transit country in the illegal trafficking of radioactive materials from Russia via Finland and Scandinavian countries.

A special Danish police section has been charged with the surveillance of certain people and businesses that engage in trading metals such as osmium, cesium and so-called "red mercury."

PET officials have said that nuclear materials such as plutonium and uranium are brought illegally to Denmark identified as other substances.

The conservative Danish newspaper JYLLANDS-POSTEN reported Sunday and Monday that Danish businessman Joergen Quist Nielsen had worked, while a PET agent, in international trafficking of nuclear materials for the profit of Libyan leader Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, among others.

Citing documents in its possession, the newspaper reported that Nielsen had been in contact with Russian bigwig Alexander Kuzin and Italian extreme-rightist Marci Affatigato.

Nielsen was arrested in Como, northern Italy, in October 1991 during a nuclear trafficking control operation launched by Judge Romano Dolce, and was later released after revealing his contacts.

PET chief Birgitte Stampe denied that Nielsen had ever worked for the intelligence organization.

GERMANY

BND Believes 11 Nuclear Warheads 'Disappeared' in Russia

AU1910120694 Munich FOCUS in German
17 Oct 94 pp 87-89

[Report by Gunther Schnattmann: "Radioactive Freight To Arrive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Welcome committees" are nervously awaiting nine men at Germany's airports. Of some of these passengers only the first or the surname is known.

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In any event they are expected to be carrying highly dangerous luggage—no matter whether they are traveling on their own or as a group.

The Federal Office of Criminal Investigation [BKA] has placed airports, the Federal Border Police, and the customs service on high alert. Since September, investigators have been expecting another attempt to smuggle in nuclear material. According to the BKA's findings, the nine, Russians, want to transport an unknown quantity of radioactive material from Moscow to Germany.

The reason for the excitement is that, unlike the recent smuggling in Munich, when Spanish couriers carrying 350 grams of weapons-grade plutonium and 400 grams of lithium were arrested at the airport, the interested buyers and contacts are unknown in this case, according to the BKA.

This means that undercover agents and members of the Western secret services are not involved this time. Thus, the investigators will not be able to seize the hot stuff easily and proudly present their success. Thus, the BKA has demanded in a memorandum to airport security forces that the lists of all passengers flying from Moscow to Germany should be compared against the nine names of suspected nuclear smugglers.

As a result of the attempt to smuggle the nuclear material uncovered in Munich, attention is increasingly focusing on the Federal Intelligence Service [BND] and its intelligence activities abroad. BND informers and their findings are to be used to a growing extent in the fight against the smuggling of highly toxic and weapons-grade nuclear material. This demand was put forth by the Parliamentary Control Commission of the Bundestag.

FOCUS has received the BND's balance sheet of international nuclear smuggling between 1992 and 1994. According to this report, between January and September of this year alone, the modern James Bonds received tip-offs concerning greater and lesser nuclear transactions, absurd-sounding offers for nuclear material, and information about dubious, small criminal deals.

The intelligence service coordinator at the Chancellor's Office, Bernd Schmidbauer, was probably particularly struck by the news. According to BND information, 11 nuclear warheads out of a shipment of 60 have disappeared on Russian territory. The missiles were being transported from Ukraine to Russia in March to be scrapped there.

The interested buyer of the 11 missiles was allegedly Iran.

The BND also mentioned German cases which have never become known publicly. Criminals tried to blackmail the land of Baden-Wuerttemberg. The arrested gangsters claimed that six nuclear warheads were stored on the territory of the new laender. In Munich the police discovered a radioactive uranium pellet (such pellets usually originate from nuclear power stations) in a quiet place—at the forest cemetery. The uranium sample is believed to have belonged to a group of criminals who have several kilograms of the material for sale.

The masterminds of these foiled deals, who are still at large, have remained unimpressed by the arrests at Munich airport. According to the BND, they were trying to sell 4 kg of plutonium a few days after the operation.

Plutonium is required for the construction of atomic bombs. But also uranium 235. In April this year, the BND learned of the planned import of uranium 235 across the German-Polish border. It is unclear whether the shipment actually took place, and nothing is known about the current whereabouts of the material. The quantity that was allegedly involved is frightening: 7.5 kg of uranium 235. Ten is enough for an atomic bomb.

The secret document also reveals why German nuclear investigators cooperate only reluctantly with their colleagues in the East, in spite of the promises by politicians in Bonn and Moscow. In August the BND learned that two nuclear dealers had been arrested in Moscow. The men were allegedly two members of the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK)—the secret service that combats nuclear deals.

Arms Dealer Views Plutonium Traffic

BR0411102894 Brussels HUMO in Dutch
7 Apr 94 pp 26-32 (Tentative)

[Interview with an unnamed arms dealer by Jan Hertoghs; place and date not given: "Humo Talks To an Arms Dealer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] How do you stand before someone who is an arms dealer? And how do you sit before someone who is an arms dealer? You sit in a cafe. You drink coffee and tea. And while he talks, you look at him. The businessman who knows his world, the citizen above suspicion, the sort of decent face with which you can become manager of a regional television station. He is Belgian, but he does not live in Belgium. He owns a restaurant, but he leaves "the cooking" to someone else. He is an arms dealer, but he never keeps weapons in his home. "I am a switch," he said. "Whoever finds me gains access to the network. Whoever finds me can get hold of whatever weapons there are to be had." For Humo, and for one time only, this is a peek through the veil hanging over thousands of illegal arms containers, especially exports from Eastern Europe. The wall has fallen, the arms bazaar is open, and the Kalashnikovs are ready!

Mister X: In Eastern Europe right now there is a total clearance sale. Everything is for sale. I only have to make one telephone call, and before the day is out I can have 1.8 kg of plutonium for you—with a certificate, and with all the official paperwork from the Institute for Nuclear Technology in Moscow.

Hertoghs: What can I do with 1.8 kg of plutonium?

Mister X: If you are a foreign power of the caliber of, say, Iran, Pakistan, or Afghanistan, you could make an atomic bomb with it.

Hertoghs: With 1.8 kg? How many atomic bombs can I make with that?

Mister X: I do not know. That is not my problem.

Hertoghs: But is not plutonium sold per gram?

Mister X: Look. I am simply trying to tell you that the quantity is there, that that batch of plutonium is directly available, and that it is for sale. The person who offers the most can buy it. However, to do that you have to have millions of dollars to lay on the table. I can also help you with a few dozen kilos of uranium. Uranium 235 and uranium 238. This is highly enriched uranium for military use, not uranium 232, okay. None of that garbage that they throw out in hospitals.

Hertoghs: I read in THE GUARDIAN that cesium smugglers were stopped at the Polish border, and that during the ID check it was found that they had sustained high doses of radiation because they were smuggling radioactive materials in their bags.

Mister X: Those kinds of runners are peddlers who cross the border with this stuff off their own bat. At my level there is no question of bungling with travel bags. The materials I can get hold of, primarily from state-run (!) laboratories in Moscow, are tested for quality and can be delivered using specialized means of transport. At my

level, we work with serious customers. And if a serious customer wants to buy a jeep, a cannon, or a tank, then I can see to it that he is invited to, say, Sophia (Bulgaria). There he will receive a color catalogue or a video to watch. If he sees a model that suits him, then a taxi or helicopter is ready within half an hour and he is taken to a depot or barracks where he can try out "his" cannon or take a ride in the tank of his choice. Say that a customer is invited to Albania. A visa is needed to go to Albania. An ordinary person has to wait weeks to get that visa. I can see to it that it is ready in 24 hours.

Hertoghs: Can anyone go shopping in the Eastern European bazaar?

Mister X: At the present time, an ordinary Belgian worker with 60,000 Belgian francs [Bfr] in his pocket can go there for vacation, buy a few CZ guns and the accompanying ammunition, and re-sell them here for a profit. The market is open—at my level too. In the past, the arms trade circuit was a completely closed circuit. Everyone knew everyone else. Everyone knew what everyone else was up to. There was just a small number of channels. Now, however, the trade is expanding in all directions. Every big businessman with a nice packet of money can now get into the arms circuit.

Hertoghs: What do you mean by a nice packet of money?

Mister X: Tens of millions.

Hertoghs: Francs?

Mister X: Dollars. These businessmen need not go to some gloomy Eastern Bloc country. They simply have to go to the major trade centers of the world, and everything can be taken care of there. Hong Kong for example. That is a floodgate where you, as a businessman, can work inconspicuously. Hong Kong is well known for its plutonium and uranium trafficking.

The Boat Is Full

Hertoghs: The trade is also said to be done directly out of Eastern European barracks.

Mister X: Since the collapse of the Soviet regime and the Warsaw Pact they no longer have a guaranteed market, but arms production has continued nevertheless. (The military-industrial complex employs some 5 to 8 million workers. Their future is uncertain. In Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Russia, hundreds of thousands of people are on the verge of losing their jobs.—author's note) Consequently, they are fervently looking for new export opportunities. Take Lithuania, for example, where at any given time they have boats full of arms next to the docks. Cannons, rockets, RPG bazookas, pistols, Kalashnikovs—you name it. The arms on that ship cannot be bought by the container. No, you have to buy the whole boat. The cost price is some Bfr40 million. But if you can pay it, you can sell these arms in the West for Bfr100 million. At this level you are not dealing with sergeants standing on street corners selling their caps and decorations. You are dealing with high-ranking officers, with generals. After all the disarmament talks, these people have stacks of "unofficial" arms. Year after year the Kremlin used to fill the Soviet Republics and the countries of the Warsaw Pact

with conventional weapons. They have so many that they cannot even count their stock any more. There have been so many political changes that nobody has an overview of the situation. According to the international agreements most of these weapons should have been destroyed already. But they have still not been destroyed. They remain stockpiled. This opens two possibilities for a general: either he throws all his stocks into the sea, or he sells them on the "parallel market." There is an official market of countries which can produce and export arms, and next to that you have a parallel market that is supplied by all sorts of concealed supply routes.

Sunday Weapons

Mister X: The entire arms trade with the former USSR is actually controlled by the KGB. Before, the KGB was already a state within a state, and it still is. Today, however, the profits are much bigger than before, because suddenly the commercial route to the West is open. Every KGB district manages its sales off its own bat. The one does not know what the other one is doing.

Hertoghs: Where is the trade concentrated?

Mister X: Primarily in the republics which have seceded, such as Ukraine, Lithuania, and Russia itself. Less so in the former puppet states such as Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Hertoghs: Yet in Poland in 1992 some 300,000 weapons were officially "missing."

Mister X: That may well be, but there are other Eastern European countries where the governments never have missing arms, because they are in the trade themselves. There are countries where, since the fall of communism, official departments have been set up to manage the parallel trafficking in arms. You can call these departments day and night. Their doors are even open on Sundays. Before, this kind of man scarcely had a single telephone in his office, now he has a battery of phones, telexes, and fax machines.

Hertoghs: What do you mean by "this kind of man?"

Mister X: Generals playing a double role, one as an army officer and the other as an arms dealer. With their contacts they can take care of transporting their official papers, and the currency they take in goes into their own pockets and to all the people they have to pay off to get the official papers.

Bullet Convoys

Mister X: The strange thing is that all the poor countries of the Eastern Bloc have received humanitarian aid from the West at some point. Poland had its food convoys, Romania had its convoys, Russia had some just one winter, and now we have the former Yugoslavia. I can tell you that arms were also transported—and still are transported—using the trucks intended for humanitarian aid. The food goes from West to East, but some trucks do not come back out of the Eastern Bloc empty.

Hertoghs: Would the driver of one of these trucks know about this?

Mister X: I do not know. What I do know is that the big bosses in the arms trade have their own transport firms available to them. What do these firms do? They make some of their trucks available free of charge for humanitarian aid transport. They know that these humanitarian aid trucks are not checked nearly as stringently, and then it is a matter of arranging the "return freight" as neatly as possible. I also know that these humanitarian convoys moving from West to East also include trucks containing stolen cars which on the return trip are loaded with arms. Now that is making 100 percent usage of the humanitarian formula.

Hertoghs: But how does a truck full of stolen cars get papers saying it is transporting humanitarian aid?

Mister X: You can buy false papers and customs stamps everywhere. In addition, people count on the fact that at the borders and checkpoints these convoys are checked as a whole, and not truck by truck.

Submarine For Sale

Hertoghs: If the Eastern European market was thrown wide open all at once, then there should have been price inflation.

Mister X: Some 10 years ago a Kalashnikov AK47 cost BFr12,000 on the Western market. Now you can buy one for BFr5,400, including delivery. And if you buy it at the source in Eastern Europe, they you pay just BFr2,500.

Hertoghs: If somebody needs arms, how does he order them?

Mister X: He faxes, or he phones, or he sends a letter via private air courier.

Hertoghs: Do people talk about the weapons, or do they use a secret jargon?

Mister X: In letters and contracts people always talk in a very detailed way about the weapon, the type, caliber, and quantity. On the phone, however, we usually talk about "toys." Big toys or little toys (laughs).

Hertoghs: I have read that there are even torpedo boats for sale from Eastern European stocks. How does that work?

Mister X: Try not to think of it as some Rambo taking one boat to some secret destination. Try to think of it as something completely normal. How is a military ship sold?

Hertoghs: I do not know.

Mister X: A military ship is sold just like an ordinary ship is sold.

Hertoghs: I do not follow you.

Mister X: It is very simple. In Eiga or Dubai (on the Persian Gulf—HUMO editor's note) there is a Russian torpedo boat. The weapons are removed and then you have an "ordinary boat," which can be sold as such.

Hertoghs: However, that ship would have a military number and is painted with camouflage paint.

Mister X: No problem. If there are no weapons on board, then it is a "civilian" ship. Naturally all the arms, the radar, and other specifically military equipment is shipped

separately. The same goes for military helicopters. They too are stripped of all weapons and sold as civilian helicopters. The only place this does not work is France, because the French consider all helicopters to be weapons of war. You can even buy submarines. They are for sale in Murmansk and Kamchatka. Anything is available if you have the money.

Sell-Off Due To End of War

Mister X: Say I am a rich Belgian carpet magnate and because of all my money and power I have become so crazy that I want to destroy Belgium: I can order laughing gas, nerve gas, and other biological and chemical weapons—either in large tanks or in small cylinders, as you wish. All the stocks which, under the international conventions must be destroyed, are now for sale.

Hertoghs: Where are they for sale?

Mister X: In the same places where conventional weapons are sold. They are all in the same pot, offered at the same bazaar. This nonchalance and blend of conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons is the dangerous bit.

Hertoghs: Yet these weapons were destroyed under international supervision.

Mister X: Apparently journalists also believe everything that is said on TV. I am telling you: On paper, everything is fine, but in actual fact there is a lot of stuff coming onto the parallel market. What do you expect? A Russian officer earns maybe \$600 [per month], while he has the chance to conclude million-dollar contracts. Be careful, just because they earn \$600 does not mean that they are stupid. These senior officers have had fantastic training. They know everything about weapons, and they are well aware of what the international prices are.

Hertoghs: In THE GUARDIAN I read that the exporting generals are paid in kind: a Mercedes worth, say, 3 million Belgian francs [Bfr] is parked in front of their house in Moscow.

Mister X: Yes, these guys are living in fantastic times. At the rate at which the stocks are now being sold, I think that their party will last another four years, then the party will be over.

Hertoghs: It looks like the generals' sales offices are located right next to the barracks.

Mister X: They are not right military bases! Russia looks like a mess, but inside these barracks there is such an autonomous bureaucracy prevailing that things there are thoroughly under control. A few years ago, a wholesaler in military memorabilia discovered a large depot in Russia where there was still an enormous stock of SS material from World War II being stored. It was a KGB barracks, and there was military equipment for an entire division, which easily comprised 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers. There were helmets, kakis, leather jackets, boots, even socks and underwear—and it was all in perfect condition. There were even tanks and Stuka airplanes from the Wehrmacht. The tanks and planes were in excellent shape. They would run the engines every month in order to maintain them. Even the boots were oiled, so that they would keep well. For all

those years, the KGB had been counting on the fact that Germany would once again become strong and they were keeping the equipment ready for a massive infiltration in the advancing German ranks.

Hertoghs: While the Germans had not worn these uniforms for a long time and had not flown Stukas for a long time either.

Mister X: That is what you say, but you are not a member of the KGB bureaucracy. They kept these things for more than 40 years, and the military memorabilia wholesaler who bought them is now bringing them onto the collectors' market in dribs and drabs, so that prices will not suddenly collapse in Germany. What I am trying to say with this example is that every war has its stocks and that in any country where there has been fighting, there is also space for a parallel arms market. Look at the Gulf War. Of all the U.S. equipment that was sent there, only a small proportion was brought back because it is much too expensive to send everything home. Just count the bunkers and depots seized that were full of Iraqi weapons and ammunition—which are also coming up for resale—including SCUD missiles.

Hertoghs: So how do these stocks end up in the hands of arms dealers?

Mister X: The American troops are gone, and these depots have come under the control of a small group of soldiers, sometimes supplemented by civilians. These people are approached with money, and then the weapons are brought to another depot—controlled by the arms dealer himself—at lightning speed.

Hertoghs: Surely the Pentagon must know about that.

Mister X: The Pentagon must know about it, and the CIA must know about it, but what do they do with this information? As far as I know, they do nothing with it. The United States also knows that the Eastern Bloc is having a clearance sale, but they are keeping quiet about it because they do not want to run afoul of Russian politics.

Hertoghs: Was Vietnam also such a source of weapons after the war?

Mister X: Certainly. There are mountains of stocks there and hundreds of helicopters which never returned to the United States. Take Lebanon, for example, where you can buy arms by the kilo, as if they were scrap iron. These are second-hand weapons but they are still okay. Anyone with some money can go there to try it out. And when the war in the former Yugoslavia ends, there will be another source.

Self-Raising Conflict

Hertoghs: If I understand you correctly, it looks like nobody has, or wants to have, any supervision over this arms trafficking.

Mister X: It is a jungle. In the past the authorities still had a grip on the arms trade, but that is no longer the case. There are so many sources of arms, and so many networks and so many small and large traffickers, that you cannot keep up with them. In addition, the world's political firmament has changed completely. We used to have two

blocs, two spheres of influence, and each major power supplied "its" countries. That has changed now. Take Angola, which used to be under the Soviet influence—and this also included weapons. However, since Angola concluded a petroleum contract with the United States it is no longer allowed to do (military) business with the Russians. But of course, you do not think that the Russians are just standing there doing nothing? Angola is still a scene of conflict. Deliveries can still be made, but through other channels.

Hertoghs: So everyone is doing it: Weapons, plutonium, and nerve gas travel around the world. Surely that is an explosive situation?

Mister X: Yes, it is dangerous. A present-day Red Army Faction would have less trouble getting hold of weapons than in the 1970's.

Hertoghs: Consequently, the IRA and ETA can supply themselves more easily.

Mister X: I think so, but as far as the extent of the trade is concerned there is no comparison with what can be delivered to the belligerents in the former Yugoslavia. There is money to be made there now, and so the weapons are flowing there. The embargo is just a strainer. A year or two ago in France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg there was a number of raids—hastily executed in a military fashion—on money transporters. Croatian and Serbian militias were behind these raids. They plundered tens of millions [currency not specified]. With this money they bought drugs from South American cartels. They sold these drugs for 10 times more to European dealers and with the profits from that they bought weapons in Eastern Europe. The fact that all the cease-fires have failed in the former Yugoslavia can be attributed to the leaders of these militias. They are mafia-types, who have every interest in seeing the war continue. By the way, did you know that the ruins of the hotels and vacation centers in the tourist areas of the former Yugoslavia have been bought up by the Italian Mafia? They are now buying shelled-out hotels for BFr50,000, and when the war is over they will have their friendly construction firms come in. They will probably benefit from reconstruction bonuses, and with a small amount of start-up capital they will have a bit of empire. That is the way it goes. One mafia sees to it that everything is shot to pieces, while the other tries to build everything back up.

In any case, as far as arms imports are concerned, Yugoslavia looks like it is on the road to recovery. There is the embargo and there was the Sarajevo and Tuzla ultimatum: It may well be that the war there is on the verge of being extinguished.

Yet I can point out some new markets. You read little in the papers about Angola, but there is something brewing there between the MPLA [Popular Liberation Movement of Angola] and the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] rebels. There is an arms race in South Africa too, with Inkatha, the ANC [African National Congress of South Africa], and Terre-Blanche's group [Afrikaner Resistance Movement]. You can see it escalating week after week: They are on the verge of a civil war. Or take Algeria, with the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]

fundamentalists. Or similar Muslim movements in Tunisia and Morocco. The smart arms dealers are already active there. Smart arms dealers foresee these developments and get going, because the process always happens in the same way. One, you have a government and an opposition, and the opposition is not listened to. Two, you have radical groups which break away from the opposition and attack it. Three, these radical groups are immediately offered arms by traffickers as soon as they commit attacks. Four, the more attacks the extremist groups carry out, the harsher the action taken by the government. Five, the escalation is under way, and the arms trade is going at full speed. Six, the example of a radical group in one country captures the imagination of a radical group in a neighboring country, and there too the same process gets under way. Consequently, they feed the polarization in that kind of country, and in doing so they create their own market, and their own demand.

Diversification

Hertoghs: Weapons from the official weapons trade also end up on the parallel market.

Mister X: Say that Bolivia buys 4,000 automatic weapons from Belgium, then I am sure that only 2,000 weapons will make it to the barracks. The rest disappear—after falsifying a few papers—immediately into the parallel market. These are classic scenarios. A company in Venezuela orders a number of containers of automatic weapons and ammunition from Belgium. On the end-user certificate it says that Venezuela is the final destination and that is okay, because arms can be traded between Belgium and Venezuela. There is no embargo, and no human rights are being violated. However, out at sea the destination changes. The ship does not set a course for South America, but for Southwest Africa, for Angola, for example. The end-user certificate is forged. You may think that this kind of certificate is easy to get hold of, just send a paper from Venezuela and everything is fine. I can tell you, however, that this kind of certificate is hard to get and that in Venezuela and other South American countries businesses have to be set up—not small, letter-box businesses, but big companies, often led by Europeans—to get these certificates from the authorities. These businesses get a substantial commission for the paperwork they do. There are arms transactions worth \$100 million dollars, and this kind of business can earn between 10 and 20 percent with its end-user certificate. On \$100 million dollars, that yields \$10 to \$20 million. That is between BFr350 million and BFr700 million.

Zeroes

Hertoghs: Are you often away for your "work?"

Mister X: Not excessively. I seldom leave Europe. I go once to the United States or Hong Kong.

Hertoghs: Do you speak any Eastern European languages?

Mister X: Not really. A few words of English is enough. The only language you need to speak is the language of money. This is trade, it is commerce. You sit across from each other with your pocket calculators and you try to make as few mistakes as possible with all these zeroes of all those millions of dollars.

Hertoghs: What does it take to be completely respected in this world?

Mister X: You need to know about weapons and prices. You must know about all types and calibers. You have to know which ammunition goes with which rapid-fire gun, which loader can be added on to which types of gun. You must read a great deal. You must be up to date.

Hertoghs: Do you have to be able to talk about other transactions?

Mister X: Yes, you must have experience. You must know the paths. Not the paths that the weapons follow if they are shipped, but the paths to reach certain people. The wider your circle of acquaintances, the higher up the ladder you go. Information is power. Say that I am sitting at a table with someone with whom I have not yet done any business. Then I have to outmaneuver the other guy. During our talk, I have to let something slip like: "Did you do a transaction three years ago in Tirana?" I have to surprise the other guy, and let him know that I have a wide circle of acquaintances and that I am in the know about everything.

Hertoghs: Do you have to have a sort of knowledge of the criminal mind for this business?

Mister X: Yes indeed. You must be able to sort out the serious customers from the bluffers. There are some people who come to me, making a big fuss, and say: "I must have 100 Kalashnikovs." I answer drily: "Then you should not come to me. I do not work under 5 or 10 thousand." They close the door quietly behind them. I myself am tested to see that I am not bluffing, or to see if I understand weapons. Then they send me a fax asking for information and the fax will contain a number of pertinent inaccuracies. If I do not react, then they know that I am too much of a lightweight.

Hertoghs: Are these kinds of arms transactions confirmed with a contract, as if it were a delivery of tractors?

Mister X: Indeed. It is a genuine contract.

Hertoghs: So, if after a month your customer has only paid half of the agreed amount, you can take him to court.

Mister X: There is no question of a half amount. The customer has to have a paper from his bank proving that the full amount is there. The arms seller will phone the bank to make sure that the money is really there, and if that is the case the transaction will take place. The arms are on the ship and the assurance from the bank is there, so then the ship can leave. The rule is first you are paid and only then do you deliver.

Hertoghs: The arms seller calls the bank? That means that the senior officials at a number of large banks must know about flows of money which always go to the same people.

Mister X: Of course the banks know that. These are not simple tellers, we are talking about top level executives, and they know very well when the matter concerns tractors or toys.

Gun Grease

Hertoghs: You have talked about contracts worth millions of dollars. The top men in this kind of trafficking must

have become multimillionaires. How can someone who makes a million dollars every month try and get more?

Mister X: The top men are not leaders of a family clan where the money has to be shared with 20 people, they are leaders of multinationals, and multinationals have their costs. They have to pay for office space, bankers, insurance, legal advisers, transporters, and ship crews. All that costs money.

Hertoghs: Do you sometimes think about the people who are killed with the weapons being traded?

Mister X: That is not my concern. If these weapons did not go through my hands, they would go via other channels.

Hertoghs: Do you know anything about the Agusta affair or other bribed army purchases?

Mister X: No. That is not my area. Those are official circles. All I know about it is what I read in the papers.

Hertoghs: Are bribes part of the arms trade?

Mister X: They are not just part of the arms trade. They are part of a great many sectors. Just look at the construction sector and contractors.

Where the Corks Pop

Hertoghs: You own a restaurant. Does your family know that you are in the arms business?

Mister X: My family only knows that I am very interested in weapons and that I buy a lot of books on the subject. They know nothing more. I am very discreet. For example, I never meet with anybody at my restaurant or at home. Everything happens in places where people do not know me or the person I am dealing with. Also, I never use my own telephone. I spend a fortune on phone cards [for pay phones].

Hertoghs: Are you rich, or filthy rich?

Mister X: Let me just say that I know the arms trade very well at a high level, but that I am in a modest position. If I had set myself up more commercially, then I would be a multi-multimillionaire by now. However, I like my low profile and the customers value it too. I do not dress in the latest fashion. I do not drive the most chic cars. I do not wear any showy rings or watches. That discretion is the reason for my durability. I am a go-between, an agent, a switch. Just like someone in the dark trying to find the light, and suddenly he finds the switch and the light, people find me too. And although I am just a switch, I do know the entire network. With the contacts that I have, I could play a much more commercial role, but then I would be too much in view of the police, and that is something I do not want. Almost every day I receive proposals to come and work for one of the major financiers. It is a daily temptation to become fabulously wealthy, but I never yield.

Hertoghs: So you do without the chic cars, the villas, the private planes, and the expensive parties.

Mister X: It is enough for me to just try them out on a regular basis, since I regularly attend these expensive bashes in one of their villas, private offices, or restaurants they own. If you want, you can go crazy from the luxury

you see around you, from the champagne in the bubble bath and the girls who you can chase in the halls and bedrooms.

Hertoghs: Do you like weapons in themselves, or do you like the business more?

Mister X: I love weapons. I love the technologies, the ingenuity behind them, the constant innovation. It is a pleasure for me to read the specifications for a weapon, how things fit together, which goes with what. When I read that, to me it is like reading a novel.

Hertoghs: Do you yourself shoot?

Mister X: No. That does not interest me much.

Hertoghs: What else do you love besides firearms.

Mister X: As a father, I love my family. My family is very precious to me. I have already told you that I am not a sponger or a playboy. I do like money, but I do not chase after it. I am not big spender. I just want to ensure that my family does not go without.

Hertoghs: Do you run any risk with the activities that you do?

Mister X: Well, more than I would if I only had a restaurant.

Hertoghs: According to THE GUARDIAN, in Eastern Germany "bodies are regularly found in hotel rooms or in lakes."

Mister X: That is the work of bandits and gangsters. One group makes a deal, and the other one jumps in with a lower price and then later there is a settling of scores. That does not happen at my level. There may well be people who would like to kill me, but because I am so discreet and because I go about my work so cautiously, they do not dare attack me. They do not know who my contacts are. They are afraid to attack me, because they do not know what forces might turn against them if they rub me out. So I live reasonably peacefully.

IAEA Spokesman Previews Nuclear Smuggling Conference

AU0211133394 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 2 Nov 94 p 2

["cf" report: "Nuclear Authority Prepares Measures Against Nuclear Smuggling"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vienna—More than 50 experts from the member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will meet in Vienna on Wednesday and Thursday (3-4 November) to prepare effective measures against the smuggling of radioactive materials from the former Soviet republics. The conference, which is the first of its kind, intends to work out an action program with detailed recommendations, which might be adopted by the Council of Governors, the highest body of the IAEA, at its next meeting on 8 December.

According to IAEA Spokesman David Kyd, these recommendations include the improvement of the treaties and conventions referring to nuclear smuggling, a program for the training of people working in nuclear facilities in the

CIS states, and a plan to establish an information center in the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, where data from all member states can be evaluated. At the moment, the money to implement these plans is lacking. "The experts must define the technical possibilities, but the Council of Governors decides on the funding," Kyd told DER STANDARD.

Nuclear smuggling has been a topic in the IAEA for years. However, it became of political interest only this summer, when several sensational cases of plutonium smuggling were disclosed in Germany.

IAEA To Create Data Bank To Combat Nuclear Smuggling

AU0311190394 Paris AFP in English 1822 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, Nov 3 (AFP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to create a data bank to combat smuggling of nuclear materials, the organization said here Thursday after a meeting of experts from 46 countries.

The data bank is to be set up in Vienna, the nuclear watchdog's headquarters, to record and analyse cases of international trafficking and determine whether they have been carried out by organised crime syndicates or by a small core of traffickers, IAEA spokesman David Kyd said.

The agency said its two-day meeting of some 100 experts had agreed "trafficking must first be combatted at its source," and favoured the IAEA extending its remit to provide coordination and other help to countries desiring it.

Such aid would include "a number of measures to help states improve their national systems of accountancy and control and their security systems for guarding these materials, in order to develop a reliable base of information on incidents to assist decision-makers and to better inform the public," the IAEA said.

The organisation also proposed helping to train personnel in charge of overseeing such materials—as it has already done in Ukraine and Kazakhstan—while also sending in monitoring experts and providing financial assistance to countries who want to beef up their methods of uncovering nuclear smuggling.

The IAEA is further prepared to allow its laboratories on the outskirts of Vienna to be used to analyse confiscated nuclear contraband, if the nations concerned do not have their own suitable facilities.

Following this week's meeting of experts, the IAEA will pass on the resulting recommendations to its governing council for discussion at its next meeting on December 8 and 9.

Russian delegate Sergei Berdnikov meanwhile estimated that "the illegal trafficking of nuclear material is not the work of a mafia but the work of more or less organised fraudsters."

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Asked about the recent cases of nuclear contraband which have emerged in former Soviet republics, especially Russia, Berdnikov said "even if small quantities of stolen material have managed to evade the vigilance of Russian authorities, no case of plutonium has been involved but (only) substances used in civilian industry."

He added "there is no proof the stolen material came from Russia," as "before 1991, we did not have the idea in Russia of the existence of such trafficking. Since then, our control systems have been reorganised."

Berdnikov stressed that, although weak points remained, it was possible to overcome them. "We are working on it even if we lack the financial resources," he said.

On Wednesday, IAEA director general Hans Blix had said he doubted trafficking nuclear material would prove a big money earner for those involved.

"I think many of these criminals and crooks around believe they can get a lot of big money for it and it is very doubtful that they do. The chances are better that they get irradiated themselves."

Illicit trafficking in nuclear substances reached spectacular new heights last August with the record seizure of 350 grams of plutonium 239 at Munich airport inside a plane which had come from Moscow.

In the first half of this year, 90 cases of nuclear contraband surfaced in Germany, following 241 during 1993, 158 in 1992 and 41 the year before that.

Experts believe Germany is a favourite port of call for smugglers because of its position at the heart of Europe and the strength of the German mark.

IAEA Official Views Measures To Prevent Plutonium Smuggling

AU0311130494 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 0553 GMT 3 Nov 94

[Interview with IAEA spokesman Hans-Friedrich Meyer in Vienna by Wolfgang Labuhn in Cologne—live]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Labuhn: Good morning, Mr. Meyer.

Meyer: Good morning, Mr. Labuhn.

Labuhn: The meeting of experts in Vienna has turned into a large conference attended by about 100 participants from 41 countries. In a closed session, it is going to draft recommendations for the December meeting of the council of governors of the IAEA. What specifically is being discussed?

Meyer: Generally speaking, three main areas are under discussion. Attention focuses naturally on several individual points. First, what international measures can be taken to prevent nuclear material from falling into unauthorized hands on the spot, in the country of origin? Second, international conventions ensuring a better legal basis for cooperation should be adopted. Thus, legal and binding steps for individual states should be stipulated.

Third, what can be done once the nuclear material has reached the black and illegal markets? The international exchange of data and international aid in the identification of the material and its origin is necessary. Thus, steps must be taken by the international community to help states get the material under control and to help them close the loopholes.

Labuhn: The first point seems to be most difficult to implement, that is the control of the fissile material in the countries of origin. How can that be ensured?

Meyer: Well, this is an area in which the IAEA started developing programs immediately after the opening of the eastern borders without such a conference and without a special request from the member states. However, so far we have only worked on a voluntary basis. Our budget is based on donations. We are helping states to build national control systems. We are also helping them to procure the means for physical protection if they do not possess them. This also includes monitoring systems for individual plants and whole control systems. We also provide support concerning the training of state officials who are in control and of the inspection personnel.

Labuhn: This sounds very abstract. Mr. Meyer, let us take a nuclear plant in Ukraine where plutonium is produced as an example. How can it be protected? In what kind of plants can protection be ensured?

Meyer: One can naturally not discuss any details here because physical security and police measures are involved. The most important thing, however, is that the Ukraine Government should have known what kind of material was where and in what quantities when the old system collapsed and Ukraine left the old Soviet Union and formed a new government. It should have found out how the material could be accessed and diverted. Scenarios should have been developed for a state control system. Second, the state should have selected suitable people to be trained to ensure complete control. A great number of seminars, training courses, and technical equipment are required to build up a complete system. That was absent at the beginning. The IAEA has helped virtually all the independent new states surrounding the Russian Federation. Specifically, this conference is discussing what else can be done, if there are other systems, and how international aid can be used to a greater extent.

Labuhn: In Germany several attempts to smuggle plutonium, the most dangerous material in the world, have come to light. This has triggered a very heated discussion about the possible dangers to the population. It also led to official agreements with Russia, one of the possible countries of origin, to stop the smuggling. Was this German hysteria or a justified concern in your view?

Meyer: First of all, material of this kind has been appearing more frequently than in the past. In any event, it is to be taken seriously. One cannot speak of hysteria. It is necessary for the illegal trade in such material to be stopped. However, one must also examine how dangerous the material was. One must differentiate between radioactive material and fissile material that can be used for the

construction of atomic bombs. Both materials are dangerous. Even though it cannot be used for atomic bombs, radioactive material, large quantities of which have recently been discovered, poses a big danger for the population, for people who come into contact with this kind of material in public places. Thus, measures are necessary. It is the unanimous view of the meeting here that something must be done. No judgment is being passed here as to whether or not the hysteria is too great. Something must be done and steps are required. This is possible at an international level. However, many also believe that bilateral measures are better suited in the sensitive sphere of protection and control.

Labuhn: The debate in Germany focuses on attempts to smuggle plutonium, that is fissile material. Has the IAEA noticed an increase in international deals involving plutonium?

Meyer: The plutonium that has been discovered so far does not come directly from the military sector but from its environment. However, one cannot claim that there is no danger just because we have not discovered any such plutonium. This would be a careless attitude. One must really be cautious and try to influence those states where the material comes from and where it can fall into the hands of unauthorized people. Programs must be developed to help them. One must not lose sight of this potential danger.

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